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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last decade, financial markets across the world have been devastated by operational risk-related incidents. These 
incidents were caused by a number of aspects, such as, inter alia, fraud, improper business practices, natural disasters, and 
technology failures. As new losses are incurred, they become part of each financial institution’s internal loss database. The 
inclusion of these losses has caused notable upward spikes in the operational risk Pillar I regulatory capital charge for financial 
institutions across the board. The inherent imperfections in people, processes, and systems–be it by intention or oversight–are 
exposures that cannot be entirely eliminated from bank operations. Thus, the South African Reserve Bank mandates South 
African financial institutions to reserve capital to cover their idiosyncratic operational risk exposures. Investors fund capital 
reserves that are held by financial institutions, and these stakeholders demand a viable return on their investment. 
Consequently, the risk exposure and capital held relationship should be fully understood, managed, and optimised. This thesis 
extends Sundmacher (2007)’s work through the use of one instance of the Standardised Measurement Approach data against 
that of the Advanced Measurement Approach, the Standardised Approach, and the Basic Indicator Approach to estimate the 
potential financial benefit that financial institutions in South Africa could attain or lose, should they move from a Basic 
Indicator Approach to a Standardised Approach, or from a Standardised Approach to an Advanced Measurement Approach, 
or from an Advanced Measurement Approach to a Standardised Measurement Approach. The Advanced Measurement 
Approach, a Loss Distribution Approach coupled with a Monte Carlo simulation was used. Parametric models were imposed 
to generate the annual loss distribution through the convolution of the annual loss severity and frequency distribution. To fit 
the internal loss data for each class, the mean annual number of losses was calculated and was assumed to follow a Poisson 
distribution. The Maximum Likelihood Estimator was used to fit four severity distributions: Lognormal; Weibull; Generalized 
Pareto; and Burr distributions. To determine the goodness of fit, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test at a 5% level of significance 
was used. To select the best fitting distribution, the Akaike Information Criterion was used. Robustness and stability tests 
where then performed, using bootstrapping and stress-testing respectively. Overall, we find that the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision’s primary consideration that postulates that there is value in a financial institution moving from the Basic 
Indicator Approach to the Standardised Approach, or from the Standardised Approach to the Advanced Measurement 
Approach is indeed valid, but fails in the movement from an Advanced Measurement Approach to a Standardised Measurement 
Approach. The best Pillar I Capital reprieve is offered by the Diversified Advanced Measurement Approach, whilst the second 
best is the Standardised Measurement Approach based on an average total loss threshold of €100k (0.87% higher than the 
Diversified Advanced Measurement Approach), closely followed by the default Standardised Measurement Approach based 
on average total loss threshold of €20k (5.63% higher than the Diversified Advanced Measurement Approach). To the best of 
our abilities, we could not find any work that is comprehensive enough to include all four available operational risk 
quantification approaches (Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach, Advanced Measurement Approach, and 
Standardised Measurement Approach), for the South African market in particular. This work foresees South African financial 
institutions pushing back on the implementation of SMA, and potentially lobbying the regulator to remain in AMA – as the 
alternative might mean increased capital requirements leading to reduced Economic Value Added to shareholders (as more 
capital is required at the same level of profitability or business activity). The financial institutions are anticipated to sight 
advanced modelling techniques as helping management have a deeper understanding of their exposures – whilst the Scenario 
Analysis process allows them a method of identifying their key risks and quantifying them (adding to management’s tools set). 
However, if South African financial institutions want to compete at a global stage and wanted to be accepted among 
‘internationally active’ institutions – their adoption of SMA may not be a choice but an obligation and an entry ticket to the 
game (global trade). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study  
 
Over the last decade, financial markets across the world have been devastated by operational risk-related incidents. 
Operational risk is the risk of loss due to failed or inadequate internal processes, systems, and people, or from 
external events (including legal risks). These incidents are caused by a number of aspects, such as fraud, improper 
business practices, natural disasters, technology failures, etc. These events are most detrimental in instances were 
operational failure triggers systemic losses across financial markets. In recent times, South African financial 
institutions have been levied with administrative penalties and fines. In 2014 the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) imposed penalties and fines totalling R125 million on Standard Bank, First National Bank, Nedbank, and 
ABSA Bank for flouting section 38 of 2001 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA). These regulatory 
fines and litigation cases typically take five to eight years to reach a court decision/settlement agreement. In 
September 2017, a Hong Kong based financial services consultancy firm postulated that since 2009 the top 50 
global banks had erased US$850 billion in profits. Of particular interest to this work is a US$342 billion in fines 
imposed on global banks by European and American regulators for misconduct. These fines are actually 
anticipated to exceed US$400 billion by 2020 against the backdrop of pending cases stemming from the US 
mortgage market in the run-up to the international financial crisis (2008). The crisis has been described by market 
participants as being the worst since the 1930 Great Depression. In 2008 the US Standard and Poor (S & P) 500 
lost approximately 50% of its value. De Jongh, van Vuuren, De Jongh, and De Jongh (2012) explored the 2008 
global financial crisis and the overarching role that operational risk played. Although the global financial crisis is 
viewed as a credit crisis, operational risk is found to have played a significant role in increasing the global financial 
crisis’ severity and duration. De Jongh et al. (2012) additionally found that the 2008 global financial crisis was 
the worst of its kind on record from an operational risk perspective. In a survey referenced by Cruz (2002), 
operational risk is estimated as the second most important cause of profitability volatility in global financial 
markets. The survey places credit risk at 50%, operational risk at 35%, and market risk at 15% respectively.  
 
1.2 The Research Problem   
 
Loss event information is retained in a data repository by the financial institution that suffers the loss. As new 
losses are incurred, they become a part of the financial institution’s internal loss database. An internal loss database 
is a pool or a collection of operational risk losses experienced by an institution from inception to current times. 
Thus, the inclusion of these incidents in the data set creates a considerable challenge for financial institutions 
using loss data dependent modelling to estimate their operational risk Pillar I regulatory capital requirements. The 
inclusion of these considerable regulatory penalties and fines into the loss data set has caused notable upward 
spikes in the operational risk Pillar I Capital charge for financial institutions across the board. As a result, financial 
companies’ institutional boards have in recent times placed increased focus on this risk type. The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and local regulators alike have also compelled banks to implement risk-sensitive 
approaches in the quantification methodologies used to calculate operational risk Pillar I Capital charges. The 
inherent imperfections in people, processes, and systems, be they by intention or oversight, amount to exposure 
that cannot be eliminated entirely from banking operations. Thus, South African banks are mandated by the SARB 
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to reserve capital to cover their particular operational risk exposure. South African banks are presently at liberty 
to practice the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the Advanced Measurement Approach  (AMA) and the 
Standardised Approach (TSA) to quantify their operational risk. The SARB determines the BIA and TSA, whilst 
the AMA depends on a bank’s internally generated methodologies. There is a wide variance in maturity levels in 
the adoption and application of these methodologies across the global financial industry. Snyman (2011) 
highlights that South African financial institutions (63 in total) mainly use the BIA and the Standardised. The core 
reasons listed for the limited uptake of AMA are: the lack of concise industry guidance and standards; the 
immaturity of the AMA within the African financial markets; the perceived complex frameworks; and the 
instruments, processes, and robust governance that are required. The estimation methodologies to be assessed 
were directed by the BCBS, and these methodologies become incrementally convoluted in a bid to encourage 
financial institutions to persistently improve their measurement and management methods used, whilst profiting 
from a lesser regulatory Pillar I charge moving from the simplest measurement framework (BIA) to the most 
sophisticated measurement approach (AMA). Contrary to the BCBS’s premise Sundmacher (2007) found that the 
incentive for a financial institution to progress from the BIA to the TSA depends on the institution’s distribution 
of its gross income (GI) among its mono-lines, and is marginal at best, or non-existent. In March 2016 the BIS 
issued a document on the Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA) for commentary BCBS (2016). The BCBS 
views the AMA as being inherently complex and lacking comparability among internationally active financial 
institutions, resulting in variability in risk-weighted capital ratios, as well as in risk-weighted asset computations. 
This has eroded confidence in risk-based capital outputs determined by the AMA. The BCBS’s objectives were 
stated as promoting reduced model complexity, improving comparability of risk-based capital measures, and 
establishing consistency in the application of global bank standards. The SMA combines a bank’s particular loss 
data (historical loss experience) that captures the bank’s relative sensitivity to operational risk with a simple 
standardised measure of operational risk (Business Indicator (BI)). The BI comprises the financial statement proxy 
(reflecting business volume) of the overall risk exposure. The BCBS’s research established that operational loss 
exposure is positively correlated to the BI, and as a result, the proposed calibration incrementally increases the 
marginal coefficients for the indicator. The key assumption for this approach is that in banks with similar BI 
values, the relationship between operational loss exposure and the BI is stable. Subsequent to the March 2016 
consultative paper, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (7 December 2017) endorsed 
the finalised Basel III package of capital reforms. The agreement was followed by a protracted delay, with 
approval initially scheduled for November 2016. As was widely expected, a new standardised approach could 
potentially replace all existing methodologies (the BIA, TSA, and AMA) for calculating Pillar I regulatory capital 
in the year 2022. It is supposed that introducing the SMA could potentially increase the minimum regulatory Pillar 
I Capital requirements, with varying degrees per given financial institution within the South African jurisdiction.  
 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The goal of this research is to determine whether or not measuring a bank’s operational risk using a more 
sophisticated measurement tool, in the form of the SMA and AMA as opposed to the TSA and the BIA, provides 
a rand benefit. It must be noted that the AMA’s requirements are that banks implement a management 
methodology and a framework that assists in modelling risk logically and methodically. This invariably attracts 
additional expenditure and costs for banks. Financial institutions’ capital reserves are funded by investors that 
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demand viable returns on their investments. Consequently, the risk exposure and capital held relationship should 
be fully understood, managed, and optimised. Thus, in this study it is our intention to extend Sundmacher (2007)’s 
work by using one instance of the SMA’s regulatory capital against that of the AMA, the TSA, and the BIA to 
estimate the potential financial benefit that South African banks may gain or lose, should they move from a BIA, 
TSA, or AMA to an SMA.  
 
The  research objectives are as follows: 
 
a. to develop and implement an Operational Risk Quantification Methodology and Management 
Framework for Pillar I Capital using the BIA, TSA, AMA, and SMA; 
 
b. to compare different Pillar I Capital estimates computed in (a) above using live data for the BIA, TSA, 
AMA, and SMA, since, to the best of our abilities, we could not locate work that was sufficiently 
comprehensive to include all four available operational risk quantification approaches (BIA, TSA, AMA, 
and SMA), in particular for the South African market; and 
 
c. to test one instance of the SMA’s capital data against that of the AMA, TSA, and the BIA, to estimate 
the potential financial benefit that South African banks may gain or lose, should they move from the 
BIA, TSA, or AMA to the SMA.  
 
Whatever each bank’s own scenario and motive is, this thesis’ consideration of adopting available quantification 
techniques can enable significant new capabilities in terms of how risk is managed and measured. For some, the 
innovations used in this thesis could herald a revolutionary change, and could be used to drive a cultural agenda 
for a firm to become more data-driven in its decisions and behaviours. For others, the innovations could likely 
realise more of an incremental change, where new tools are merely added to existing practices.  
 
1.4 Research Design/Methodology Summary 
 
This thesis focuses on providing an operation risk management framework for the implementation of the BIA, 
TSA, AMA, and SMA. In the BIA, the TSA and the newly proposed SMA, generic alpha and beta factors were 
used in fixed formulas in line with the Basel text. In the AMA, parametric models were imposed to generate the 
annual loss distribution through the complexity of the annual loss severity and frequency distributions. Internal 
loss data (ILD), Scenario Analysis data, and ELD were used in varying degrees and forms in the AMA’s modelling 
process. The following steps were executed: constructing risk classes; preparing data; selecting models; 
calculating the aggregated loss distribution; obtaining the value at risk (VaR) and the expected loss; and 
calculating the total diversified capital. In this thesis the Scenario Analysis data and ILD have been used as the 
direct inputs into capital calculations. Statistical tests were performed to determine the best fitting data 
distribution. Tests such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test, and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were 
considered to determine the goodness-of-fit (GoF). The following steps were followed to fit the ILD:  
 
For each class within the operational risk classes (ORCs), the mean annual number of losses was calculated and 
was assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. The method of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) was used 
to fit four distributions, namely the Lognormal, Weibull, Generalised Pareto, and Burr distributions. To determine 
the goodness-of-fit, the KS test at a 5% level of significance was used. To select the most suitable distribution, 
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the AIC was used. This criterion ensured that the issues of over-fitting were considered, and that all distributions 
were on a level playing field. That is, using the AIC ensured that the good fit was not merely the result of the 
distribution possessing more parameters. Hence, the distributions were assessed on the same level, irrespective of 
the number of parameters they had. Using the AIC selected distribution, further tests were conducted to ensure 
that the fit was robust and stable. The tests for robustness and stability included the bootstrapping test and stress 
test. A simulated annual aggregate loss distribution (ALD) was obtained, from which the variance, percentiles, 
mean, and median were ascertained. Classes were then aggregated into operational risk cells assuming 
independence between each class profile. In the diversification process, the Variance-Covariance Approach was 
used to diversify the VaR. However, particularly noteworthy is that the utilised data only emanated from one of 
the South African internationally active banks, due to the proprietary restrictions on operational risk data in 
general. The methodology was designed in such a manner that it is transferable to any other financial institution 
registered in South Africa, or to financial institutions in the rest of the world for that matter.  
 
1.5 Summary Findings and the Study’s Significance 
 
A case-study method was applied to address the research objectives using in-house loss data from a major South 
African bank, as well as Scenario Analysis estimates. The results of the study show that material gains can be 
achieved by switching from the BIA to the TSA or to the AMA, in terms of lowering a banks’ requirements for 
regulatory capital. Using the BIA, the Pillar I Capital charge amounted to R7.38 billion. Our results show that 
using a single year as opposed to a three-year average resulted in volatility in Pillar I Capital, which could give 
rise to financial instability in a bank’s balance sheet. We also found that the rate of change on a year-on-year basis 
for risk-weighted assets (RWAs) and the BIA’s Pillar I Capital charge is in line with the rate of change in the risk 
exposure. We found that RWAs that were computed using various estimation approaches for the same financial 
institution resulted in a profile that was the same as that observed in the Pillar I Capital profile, owing to the fact 
that RWAs are a straight line multiple of Pillar I Capital (intra-bank). Therefore, the inclusion or exclusion of an 
RWA analysis in this thesis is of no consequence in meeting our defined objectives. 
 
In the TSA, beta factors were multiplied by the GI per business line (BL) to determine an estimate of the Pillar I 
Capital charge of R6.91 billion. In our results, we established that the relative GI contributions per BL mainly 
consist of corporate finance (6%), commercial banking (21%), trading and sales (23%), and retail banking (43%). 
This profile is in line with expectations and is deemed generic to Southern African commercial banks, where the 
GI is skewed towards these four market offerings. Our results showed that a financial institution’s business mono-
line structure is a significant influential aspect in choosing between the BIA and the TSA, which is in line with 
Sundmacher’s (2007) findings. Sundmacher (2007) points out that a key differentiator between the TSA and BIA 
is that on the whole, a reduction in the operational risk capital charge is attainable when the negative GI of one of 
the financial institution’s BLs is compensated by another. However, there are no such liberties permitted when 
using the BIA. Notwithstanding this identified set-off offered by the TSA, the ultimate Pillar I Capital reserve 
cannot be negative and thus result in a set-off counter to credit or market risk Pillar I Capital reserves. We 
determined that this phenomenon was not readily evident in our set of results, as all BLs for the even period had 
positive GI. We found that neither the simplistic BIA nor the TSA resulted in a capital reduction due to 
contingency plans or commercial insurance, or on the basis of diversification benefits––a privilege only reserved 
for the AMA and the SMA. Overall, our results show that there is considerable enticement for banks to move 
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from the BIA to the TSA. We found that such a decision could result in the explicit benefit of a 6.37% reduction 
in the Pillar I Capital charge. 
 
In analysing our AMA’s model data and results, we found the data-set to be largely dominated by expected losses 
(ELs) and lacking in unexpected losses (ULs) (tail events). However, this is not a limitation specific to this study, 
rather it is generally a limitation for studies of this kind. It does mean that the final data samples that could be 
used as model inputs were limited. This naturally makes result interpretations problematic from significance and 
robustness perspectives. Most of the ORCs that qualified for modelling failed the stringent robustness and stability 
tests due to a few extremely large losses in comparison to the ORCs’ complete profile. Some of the ORCs failed 
the bootstrapping tests that were performed, owing to the presence of heavy tails (where an ORC had two profiles). 
Classes or ORCs that had ILD characterised by ELs with a lone outlier, had less sensitive parameters when they 
were tested for stress. A total of 22 operational risk cells were mapped to the internal losses. This level of 
granularity resulted in some operational risk cells having limited or insufficient number of data points that were 
inadequate for modelling. The identified ORCs effectively embodied loss systems–potential and actual–where 
operational risk losses were recorded or thought to have occurred. A set of hypothetical scenarios was used in this 
study and was fitted (using the Weighted Least Squares Approach (wLSA), with a λ=1). We found that the 
lognormal distribution was the ideal fitting distribution. The diversification formula used considered the EL, the 
undiversified VaR, and the correlation matrix. The diversification benefit was found to be 25.8%. The overall 
AMA-explicit benefit for this case of data analysed for the period 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2017 (11 Years) 
is found to be TSA-AMA (R6 914 732 370.24 - R4 207 677 453 = R2 707 054 917.38 {39.15% reduction}). We 
found that there was considerable enticement for banks to move from the BIA to the TSA (6.37%) and 
furthermore, to move to the AMA. In comparison to the TSA base, the AMA has can potentially award South 
African capital a benefit or reprieve of 39.15% (17.97% in the case of undiversified capital). Using the process 
illustrated in Chapter 3, financial institutions can estimate the tenable financial rewards or benefits for several 
years. Thus, armed with the multiple or manifold year financial benefit, South African financial institutions can 
determine whether or not the benefits are such that they would warrant assessing the costs of switching 
approaches. This initial, computed financial benefit could potentially be assigned to meet the expenses related to 
the technological systems required to meet the AMA’s qualification criteria.  
 
The SMA combines a bank’s idiosyncratic loss data that captures the bank’s relative sensitivity to operational risk 
with a simple standardised measure of operational risk. A strong theme that was identified within our results, and 
that requires some additional attention, is the uncertainty of impact. Supervisors have discretion to modify the 
loss multiplier’s role in the capital calculation. In this thesis, we assessed three possible implementations:  
 
a) Capital = Business Indicator Component (BIC) x Internal Loss Multiplier (ILM) (with losses > €20k), 
the default approach;  
b) Capital = BIC x ILM (with losses > €100k); and  
c) Capital = BIC (with the ILM set to 1).  
 
Setting the ILM equivalent to 1 implies that the BIC and the loss component (LC) are equal. In analysing the BIC 
as a percentage of Pillar 1 Capital, we established that the ILM has a significant influence on capital. While 
reductions in Pillar I Capital can potentially be envisaged in certain jurisdictions, large increases can occur in 
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other jurisdictions as a result of the inclusion of the ILM. In our results, by setting the ILM as equal to 1, the net 
increase in capital was 34%, in comparison to the default SMA, where €20k is used. This is an example of the 
potential impact of supervisory discretion that could result in variability, in comparison to the default SMA 
approach. Supervisors can also increase the loss collection threshold from €20k to €100k. We found that 
increasing the collection threshold results in relatively minor capital reductions in each case. We also found that 
the Rand:Euro rate applied both to the BIC and the LC is a significant input parameter in the framework. Differing 
interpretations of the BCBS’ text might lead one to apply a single rate across all 10 years in the LC and all three 
years in the BIC, the alternate interpretation using an annual average foreign exchange conversion rate for each 
year used in the calculation. In our study we applied a single foreign exchange conversion rate across all years. 
To accurately assess impact, greater clarity from the SARB is required in terms of their expected implementation. 
This would provide national certainty for the South African financial markets, yet still allow for significant 
international variation and questionable comparability. 
 
It was thought that introducing the SMA, in comparison to the current BIA, TSA, and AMA regime, would 
potentially increase the minimum regulatory capital requirements. Our findings show that the new SMA is likely 
to exceed the total of the current Pillar I and Pillar II levels for similar sized banks. According to the Basel text, a 
firm’s loss experience is considered in the estimation of Pillar I Capital through the ILM. Our results show that 
the entity under study incurred net operational risk losses amounting to R1.539 billion (739 events as defined by 
the BCBS) and that they have recovered R309 million (20% recovery rate) through insurance claims and their 
own loss recovery means. This translates to a net loss of R1.230 billion (€98 million). Our results show that the 
LC (R1.8 billion - 2017) was smaller than the BIC (R5.9 billion) by a factor of 3.24 times (2017), which by 
implication means that the ILM is less than 1. The ILM (with losses > €20k) was found to be 0.7467 (2017), whilst 
the ILM (with losses > €100k) was found to be 0.7130 (2017). We thus concluded that financial institutions that 
have a smaller loss operational risk profile relative to its BIC, as is the case the bank under study, will hold a lower 
Pillar I Capital reserve in comparison to the capital charge implied by the ILM = 1. Our results show that the 
percentage change in the SMA components was higher in 2016 than in 2017. This was largely driven by the BICs 
against an 8.35% increase in GI (2016). Comparing the Pillar I regulatory reserve as a fraction or percentage of 
GI gives a clearer picture of relative capitalisation, regardless of the estimation approach being used. We found 
the following Pillar I Capital to GI ratios (2017):  14.11% (BIA); 13.38% (TSA); 10.97% (undiversified AMA); 
8.14% (diversified AMA); 8.599% (SMA ≥ €20k); 7.64% (SMA ≥ €100k); and 11.056% (SMA with ILM set to 
1) of GI. We made a similar comparison of Pillar I Capital per full time employee (30,000 employees), and our 
results indicate that as at 31 December 2017, similar sized banks held on average the highest level of Pillar I 
Capital with the BIA (R246k per employee), the TSA (R230k per employee), the undiversified AMA (R189k per 
employee), the diversified AMA (R140k per employee, the least holding ratio of all options), the SMA where the 
threshold was €100k (R141k per employee), the SMA where the threshold was €20k (R148k), and the SMA with 
ILM set to 1 (R198k). Our results show that capital increases are most likely to be experienced in the largest banks 
(those with assets exceeding €750 billion), whereas in smaller banks the impact is neutral or muted. 
 
Overall, we find that the BCBS’s primary premise that there is value in a financial institution moving from a BIA 
to a TSA, or from a TSA to an AMA is indeed valid, but is disrupted in its movement from an AMA to an SMA. 
The best Pillar I Capital reprieve is offered by a Diversified AMA, and the second best is an SMA, based on an 
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average total loss threshold of €100k at R4.2 billion (0.87% higher than the AMA), closely followed by the default 
SMA based on an average total loss threshold of €20k at R4.444 billion (5.63% higher than the AMA) to be 
introduced in 2022. Notwithstanding the BCBS’s objectives, there is a strong argument for retaining the AMA 
since the accurate modelling of operational risk assists management to recognise where leading exposures occur 
within the bank. By analysing such exposures, in the context of key risk indicators (KRIs) and risk control self-
assessments (RCSAs), managers are informed of the organisational profile and are then able to make choices 
regarding risk transfer and risk mitigation strategies. Additionally, in comparison to the proposed SMA (SMA ≥ 
€20k), a Diversified AMA also offers a 5.63% Pillar I Capital reprieve to financial institutions . Regardless of the 
specific implementation, we are of the view that removing internal models will result in increased supervisory 
focus on Pillar II and stress testing. Thus, an area of interest is the future supervisory treatment of parts of the 
AMA framework, such as the use of ELD and Scenario Analysis, which some regulators will likely seek to retain 
in some form. The balance of this research work is organised as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 provides an all-inclusive literature review. In Chapter 3 the research approach is deliberated on, and the 
theoretical basis for the study is provided. In Chapter 4 the considerable benefits that may be realised when a 
financial institution moves from a BIA to a TSA to an AMA and an SMA is described in great detail. Chapter 5 
completes the study with concluding remarks and recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter an extensive overview of the topic and its relevance to the current South African banking 
environment was provided. Operational risk intricacies are such that they can be managed but they cannot be 
completely eradicated, owing to the imperfections in a bank’s processes, systems, and people. This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that it is challenging to measure this risk (operational), especially in comparison to market 
risk and credit risk. In this section of the thesis, we provide an extensive and comprehensive literature review that 
explains technically difficult material in a clear and logical manner. This section engages with some of the seminal 
work that has been done in addition to the BCBS’s contributions, which introduce some of the estimation 
approaches discussed in this thesis. The underlying theories and the practical issues pertaining to the regulatory 
environment in which banks operate are also presented.  
 
2.2 Regulatory Capital Reprieve 
 
Sundmacher (2004) extensively critiques the GI metric as a potential risk indicator as used in the TSA and the 
BIA. The paper details how trading volumes, as opposed to GI, could be comparably better suited as a key 
operational risk indicator. The paper details all the other leading indicators that it deems more insightful to 
operational risk exposure. The BCBS (2009) in contrast to Sundmacher (2004), justifies the BCBS’s use of GI, 
owing to its failure to identify increased risk sensitivity in other indicators, and other indicators’ comparability, 
their ability to increase relative simplicity and to reduce the likelihood of arbitrage. The Sundmacher (2004) paper 
concludes by demonstrating that the possibility of gaming Pillar I Capital charge under both approaches, that is 
the TSA and the BIA is possible. (See also Snyman (2011) for a collaborative sentiment). The most important 
contribution of this paper relates to structuring the decision as to which measurement approach to choose, by 
comparing the data collection, collation, and developmental costs against the benefits of Pillar I Capital charge 
relief. Sundmacher (2007) emphasises that the financial institution’s structure is a key persuading factor in making 
a choice between the TSA and BIA. Sundmacher (2007) further notes that in contrast to the AMA and the SMA, 
neither the TSA nor the BIA led to a Pillar I Capital charge relief against contingency plans, commercial insurance, 
and diversification benefits.  
 
El Arif, and Hinti (2014) detail examples of large operational risk losses that have had unfavourable consequences 
on global capital markets at large. The paper highlights hedging expected and unexpected operational risk 
exposures, by holding sufficient levels of Pillar I Capital. The paper also discusses some of the obstacles to 
measuring operational risks (such as the lack of historical loss data). The paper also highlights that a standard 
Poisson distribution needs at least 1,082 data points for optimal function. A Lognormal distribution (example of 
a severity distribution) requires at least 1,000,000 data points to yield a satisfactory estimate. In keeping to the 
theme, Laycock (2014) focuses on an AMA’s data requirements, risk management demands, and the general 
perceptions of implementing AMA. The author also identifies the point at which data collation and its storage and 
infrastructure costs become major inhibitors for financial institutions migrating from a TSA to an AMA. He 
additionally highlights that in the instance that a bank uses a TSA and a BIA, the single means of reducing the 
capital reserve is to make less GI. Such a goal is counterproductive to all other key business objectives.  Laycock 
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(2014) also identifies other challenges, such as an inability to reverse engineer the AMA’s sub-components. For 
credit risk and market risk, each factor that makes up value of risk can be identified. The paper touches on certain 
reservations and concerns regarding implementing AMA models, however, notwithstanding these cons, the AMA, 
in contrast to the TSA and BIA, remains the preferred quantification approach. The additional challenges relate 
to validation difficulties, and the resultant potential volatility. The paper advocates using a lower confidence 
interval, which can be scaled up to produce a quantum equivalent to the 99.9% that aligns to the demands of 
regulators at large. This quantification methodology is not new as such, but it has its origins in market risk. 
Laycock (2014) ends his work by highlighting that in contrast to the BIA, the AMA leads to an a priori Pillar I 
Capital charge that is lower. El Arif and Hinti (2014) add that notwithstanding the assumption that the expenses 
or costs associated with using the AMA are high, the marginal cost is not high. El Arif and Hinti (2014) assessed 
the BIA against the TSA and they established that financial institutions that deal in brokerage/retail banking would 
attain better capital reprieve from the TSA, that being 12% of their GI, as opposed to the BIA’s higher beta factor 
of 15%. Thus the authors conclude that in comparison to retaining the BIA, it is advantageous or more lucrative 
to move across to the TSA, despite the compliance costs that would be incurred.  
 
The fundamental theme of increasing complexity in the quantification approach of Pillar I Capital, where financial 
institutions receive a capital reprieve to incentivise them to improve their operational risk management and 
measurement through a lower Pillar I Capital charge, is discussed by Francesco and Ardita (2012). The authors 
assessed the viability of using the AMA in Albanian financial markets through a cost–benefit analysis. The authors 
assessed the challenges that Albanian financial institutions encountered when implementing an AMA. The authors 
differentiate between the two forms of AMA, namely the Internal Measurement Approach and the Loss 
Distributional Approach (LDA). In using the direct LDA, external data (ELD) is initially linearly adjusted to the 
bank’s size by using coefficients for each event type through regression. A data filter is then applied, and the data 
is then integrated into the modelling process. Francesco and Ardita (2012) also looked at the various possibilities 
for mixing the ILD and ELD. To achieve this, the authors propose the following techniques: convolution; 
qualitative integration; and Bayesian Aggregation.  
 
Francesco and Ardita’s (2012) paper highlights the challenge of insufficient data in Albania for operational risk 
quantification. The authors suggest using a Scenario Analysis, or using additional data. This mentioned data 
involves using ELD through Extreme Value Theory (EVT). The authors’ paper states the difficulties of estimating 
operational risk exposures as being: data shortage; the essence of operational risk; and the limited availability of 
exposure measures that are risk-sensitive in operational risk modelling. The authors claim that the final challenge 
is concerned with the lack of ELD collation practices amongst financial market players. Additional difficulties 
are concerned with the use of ELD, and include the lack of low frequency and high severity events, or tail events 
(Allen & Bali, 2004). These tail events are critical in informing the tail of parametric distribution. Allen and Bali 
(2004) conclude by adding that risk data harnessed during a recession is deemed unsuitable for use in economic 
expansion, further exacerbating the matter (data shortage). Moving to an AMA can have some benefits, such as 
the removal of regulatory arbitrage, the recognition of diversification benefits, the inclusion of insurance 
mitigation, the consideration of risk controls, and increased innovation in the quantification process (Kaiser & 
Kohne, 2006). The net effect is the encouragement to financial institutions to advance their risk management and 
risk processes. Qualitative drawbacks of the AMA are listed as:  
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a) steep development costs for internal models;  
b) the AMA is used exclusively by big banks, thus giving them a potential biased benefit in comparison to 
competitor banks;  
c) the AMA does not guarantee a capital benefit post moving to it; and  
d) the same level of risk management can be achieved with simpler approaches in level with what can be 
achieved with the AMA (Rebonato, 2007).  
 
Francesco and Ardita (2012) concur with Kaiser and Kohne (2006)’s critique of the BCBS’s primary proposal 
that banks that migrate from other simplistic estimation approaches to the AMA are rewarded with a reduction in 
the Pillar I Capital charge. The Francesco and Ardita (2012) paper highlights that the AMA assumes that high 
percentiles of VaRs, if added together, result in an unrealistic indicator of the size of the exposure. This would 
effectively imply that the worst consequences occur concurrently, a phenomenon–which, from experience–is 
never the case. In instances where the concept of seamless correlation across ORCs is regarded as being valid, to 
attain the Pillar I Capital charge, one must sum all ORCs. This results in a higher Pillar I Capital charge in 
comparison to the simpler TSA and BIA approaches. The paper was concluded in agreement with Nash (2003), 
and it was established that banks should be weary of assuming that moving to an AMA will translate to a capital 
reprieve or capital benefit. The authors advocate that banks should openly explore all other available estimation 
techniques that potentially take into account a financial institution’s idiosyncrasies. Afambo (2005) also questions 
the presumption that operational risk measurement approaches, such as the AMA, offer a Pillar I regulatory 
reserve reprieve ahead of the TSA, or the BIA. Afambo’s (2005) reservations and scepticism are collaborated by 
a Fitch Risk Management (2004) survey, where 42 internationally active financial institutions expressed the view 
that the TSA and the BIA could yield Pillar I Capital charges lower than the Pillar I Capital charge estimated by 
the AMA. Sundmacher (2007)’s conclusions are also aligned to those of Francesco and Ardita’s (2012). 
Sundmacher (2007) uses a hypothetical case to demonstrate that the capital benefit of a hypothetical bank depends 
on the distribution of its GI. Sundmacher (2007) found that the financial benefit of moving from the BIA to the 
TSA could not be ascertained, and was at best marginal.  
 
2.3 The Advanced Measurement Approach  
 
To meet supervisory reliability standards, internationally active banks using the AMA are required to use key data 
aspects (BIS, 2006). These are: ELD; business environment and internal control systems; a Scenario Analysis; 
and ILD. Most African financial institutions lack data, which is a prevalent challenge in the rest of the world, as 
demonstrated in 2.2 above. The appropriate approaches for modelling operational risk losses can be classified into 
two types, Parametric Approach and the Non-Parametric Approach. These two main approaches are explained in 
Chernobai, Rachev and Fabozzi, (2012), whose work is the seminal reference for this section. In modelling this 
type of risk, there are cases where no parametric method fits the empirical data. This can be as a result of data that 
incorporates different profiles. In these situations, a complex method of data modelling might be needed, for 
example, using a combination of parametric distributions in order to capture the profile of underlying distributions. 
On the other hand, non-parametric methods work better under such circumstances, as their complexity directly 
depends on the data sample and is simpler to model than, say, parametric methods. Non-parametric methods have 
their own drawbacks, and these include a trade-off between variance and bias, that is, the fitted model’s increased 
complexity decreases bias and increases the estimation variance. Thus, certain methods of fitting the non-
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parametric methods are used to ensure that there is balance between the two. Some of non-parametric methods 
include kernels, series, and splines. Operational risk distributions are renowned for their “long or fat tails”. To 
precisely quantify the likelihood in the distribution’s tail section, a significant observation is required. The 
observation must be independent and identically distributed (iid). In instances that the observation is not iid, the 
data must be in ample quantities to characterise each ORC. The main inputs for the actuarial model are the 
frequency and the severity of distributions. In modelling operational risk exposures, the financial institutions’ 
losses have a frequency of occurrence. This frequency is essentially the quantity of loss data events that happen 
or are realised per defined time interval. This frequency is stochastic in nature (and not deterministic). Using the 
Poisson distribution requires the restrictive assumption that the distribution’s mean equals the variance. However, 
there are instances where we wish to model the intensity of a number of events, where the variance in the number 
of events exceeds the mean. In this case, the negative binomial distribution (NBD) is a logical choice. The NBD 
is flexible, owing to the fact that it has two parameters, unlike the Poisson distribution that only has one (Afambo, 
2005).  
 
A further classification can be made if one closely examines the properties of the distributions that belong to both 
the Parametric Approach and the Non-Parametric Approach, based on the nature of the distributions or based on 
the part of the loss distribution that they are more suitable to estimating, and this is broadly classified as the body 
and the tail distributions. For the tail of the loss distribution, it is recommended that sub-exponential distributions 
are used (BIS, 2006). In some cases, the distributions are used to estimate both the body and the tail of the loss 
distribution. In their paper, Dutta and Perry (2007) list measures for selecting the appropriate distributions. These 
measures are ranked according to the order of importance. The distribution or method is also characterised or 
classified according to robustness, consistency, and coherence. De Fontnouvelle, Rosengren, and Jordan (2004) 
and Dutta and Perry (2006) identify the most prevalent distributions for modelling the operational risk loss 
severities as being: g-and-h distributions, Exponential, Weibull, Generalised Pareto, Lognormal, Lognormal-
gamma, and Log-logistic. In comparison to the other distributions for modelling, the Lognormal, Generalised 
Pareto, Gamma distributions, Weibull, and Burr distributions were found to be more stable and are suitable for 
use with small samples. The interesting elements that they highlight are as follows: the Burr distribution (which 
can be used to modelling fat tail distributions) is a three-parameter distribution that is less stable but more flexible, 
requiring at least 100 data points to be used securely; and the Lognormal distributions have continuous probability 
distributions, and its natural logarithms are normally distributed. The probability distribution functions (PDFs) 
and cumulative distributional functions of the listed distributions are extensively discussed in Dutta and Perry 
(2006) and in Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006).  
 
According to Shevchenko (2011), the availability of data, or lack thereof, is one of the most challenging aspects, 
given the nature of operational risk. The loss observations that are normally collected by the banks are lacking in 
tail events or losses. These losses are imperative in modelling operational risk accurately. Most financial 
institutions lack comprehensive operational risk losses for ensuring stable and reliable models. This issue of 
scarcity of data has resulted in most financial institutions observing other financial institutions’ data. This data 
takes the form of pooled data, public data, or consortium data. However, this also has drawbacks, for example, 
the data might need to be scaled (by both country and bank size) to ensure that it reflects the size of the current 
relevant bank. It is in such cases then that banks supplement the data (or sometimes validate the available losses 
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or profile) with expert judgment. Expert judgment is known as Scenario Analysis, and the approach is referred to 
as the Hybrid Approach, i.e. both the LDA and the scenario-based approaches are used in order to build a stable, 
robust, and realistic operational risk profile for the bank. Scenario Analysis is a method that management uses to 
critically review historical events the financial institution and by other financial institutions have experienced, in 
a bid to identify idiosyncratic risks, breakdowns in the current control environment, etc. It is a means of soliciting 
and quantifying expert opinion in instances where ILD is inadequate to offer reliable, adequate, and precise VaR 
estimates. A Scenario Analysis can also be used as an independent means to validate EL, Unexpected Loss, and 
VaR outcomes of a loss data-based model. Thus, a Scenario Analysis introduces a forward-looking aspect to the 
LDA, be it in determining the VaR, or its validation (BIS, 2006). A Scenario Analysis produces severity and 
frequency distributions that are processed by internal models. The litmus test for a Scenario Analysis is the 
requirement that requires that business experts must deem the model’s results to be reasonable, despite the fact 
that they are estimated by statistical distributions. The reasonability test is largely achieved by conducting a Monte 
Carlo Simulation Approach as the basis of the distribution. The Monte Carlo Simulation Approach captures the 
uncertainty in the frequencies and severities estimated by the Scenario Analysis process (Shevchenko, 2011). 
Thus, the Monte Carlo Simulation Approach is a means to redress uncertainty, and also builds in conservatism 
over and above the expert’s anticipations (Frachot, Moudoulaud & Roncalli, 2003). According to the BCBS 
(2006), VaR is estimated at a 99.9% confidence level, thus the expert estimations should be transformed to a 
statistical loss distribution to reflect this requirement. The key challenge in sourcing information is that subject 
matter experts are more business-minded than quantitative-minded people in terms of modelling operational risk. 
Hence, the methodology used to elicit information from the subject matter experts becomes highly significant, as 
it might lead to overstating or understating capital. Different approaches can be used to source information from 
experts, but the approach used will be directly linked to the method used to model the resulting data. The key 
methodologies mentioned in the literature are the Interval, Durations, and Fixed Percentile approaches (Frachot 
et al., 2003). 
 
Afambo (2005) implements an AMA model that employs an LDA in an EVT setting. He identifies four estimation 
methodologies: Scenario Based; Fixed Ratios; Probabilistic; and Risk-based Capital approaches. The AMA is 
classified as a Probabilistic Approach, and it is largely seen as being complex in nature, however, it performs 
better than its equivalents, owing to its utilisation of randomly simulated data to determine the likelihood that 
ideally describes probable consequences. According to Embrechts, Kaufmann, and Samorodnitsky (2004), the 
shortcomings of the LDA and the EVT lie in failing to fully capture the atypical nature of operational risk. The 
EVT and the LDA assumptions are exemplified as being at cross-purposes with operational risk characteristics. 
Afambo (2005) bemoans the fact that most distributional models are designed to suit large data pools. Limited 
data, decision time, and computational resources underpin most complications in estimating operational risk. 
Afambo (2005) circumvented data constraints by using Fitch Risk Management data (ELD) for the 22 years 
ending in 2002. The major difficulty of empirical research on ELD is the unknown truncation point (reporting 
bias). The use of ELD means that the data has varying contributors that give rise to the reporting bias. Another 
issue relates to scaling complexities, owing to different sized financial institutions contributing to the pool. A 
random truncation model was used to redress the reporting bias on the presumption of a logistic distribution. 
Afambo (2005) used the Student T-Copula Approach to model dependency structures, whilst the Poison 
distribution was used to model the frequency of loss occurrences. Afambo’s (2005) conclusive findings were that 
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in instances where an identified truncation point (constant) is presumed, the severity parameters were found to be 
higher (as well as the resulting Pillar I Capital charge). This presumed identified truncation point (constant) 
disregards the intrinsic reportage bias in the data, effectively giving the same weighting to all observations. The 
reasons for thresholds have been stated as being the existence of loss collection thresholds and taking cognisance 
of insurance deductions from the losses. Frachot et al. (2003) details the mechanics of the converse relationship 
of a higher Pillar I Capital charge against an increase in the collection threshold. An MLE is stated as being 
arguably the most often used estimation method in the banking industry. The MLE precisely measures areas where 
the probability mass is concentrated. One of the reservations against the use of the MLE includes the limitation 
that asymptotic approximations are not sufficiently accurate when dealing with limited data sets. This leads to 
parameter errors that are significantly different from normal (bias of MLE); when using a method like MLE, the 
modeller cannot exactly ascertain which sample size would be deemed large enough for an asymptotic 
approximation (De Fontnouvelle, DeJesus-Rueff, Jordan, and Rosengren, 2003). Working with truncated data is 
a norm in operational risk, and thus, the use of conditional PDFs is necessary. These conditional PDFs introduce 
instabilities into the estimation of parameters when using MLE. Introduces a penalty function reduces these 
instabilities and improves the accuracy of the estimated parameters. These parameters are considered to be robust. 
The issue of robustness is important in operational risk, as the severity distributions are heavy-tailed, and the 
parameters are sensitive due to extreme values that are included in the loss data. This concept of penalised MLE 
(PMLE) is discussed in detail by Cope (2011).  
 
Snyman (2011) discusses all key building blocks in the AMA starting from the data analysis and progressing to 
Pillar I Capital quantification and capital allocation, in a case study format. He alludes to the lack of an all-
inclusive best-practice approach to estimating operational risk, notwithstanding the BCBS’s (2009; 2011b) 
communiqués. The novelty in this paper relates to: the shortage of data; the level of granularity; and its impact on 
the outcome (an ORC that is too granular leads to a distributional split). Most financial institutions in the BCBS’s 
(2009) study had 20 to 60 cells (ORCs). This has implications for the Pillar I Capital allocation process and the 
Use Test. The EVT and the decision tree used to choose between severity distributions are discussed at length 
(tail and light-tailed). The optimum truncation point and thresholds are also highlighted as being pivotal in the 
AMA process. The body distributions deliberated on by Snyman (2011) are: Lognormal; Normal; Weibull, 
Rayleigh Beta; Chi-Square; Exponential; Gamma; and Inverse Gaussian. The tail distributions deliberated on are: 
Generalised Extreme Value Distribution; Log Gamma; Burr; Cauchy; F; Generalised Pareto Distribution; Log 
Logistic; Pareto; and Student T (see also Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006) for a thorough review of the same 
distributions). Notwithstanding the fact that Snyman looks at 18 distributions in total, the Range of Practices (BIS, 
160b) states that 31% of financial institutions employ one theoretical distribution (17% of them use the Weibull 
and whilst 33% use Lognormal). Snyman (2011) highlights that the Geometric, the Negative Binomial, and 
Poisson distributions are used to model loss occurrence. Mignola and Ugoccino (2006) advocate for the Poisson 
distribution as opposed to the other two, as they deem it to be ideal for modelling the frequency over an extended 
period of time. The Mean Excess Plot, Stability Parameter Plot, Hill Plot Estimator, the Dekkers, Einmahl, and de 
Haan Plot, the Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm Plot, and the Tail Plot are tests and graphic plots that were used 
in this research. Snyman’s (2011)  distribution fitting methodologies are: Method of Moments; Probability wLSA; 
Least Squares; Maximum Likelihood Estimation; and Robust Least Squares.  Graphic Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) 
techniques were used to complement the numerical fitting methodologies listed above (the same is expansively 
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deliberated by Perry & Dutta (2006)). The authors perform the subsequent assessments: Probability Differences; 
Quartile-Quartile Plot; and Probability Plot. The GoF techniques applied were listed as the: Quadratic Anderson-
Darling; Quantities; KS Test; Evaluation of Probabilities; Analysis of Fit Difference; and the Cramer von Mises 
technique. The Gaussian Copula is used to model the interdependence structures. The paper provides a 
methodology for estimating a Stand-alone VaR (assumption of full dependence) and a Diversified VaR. The paper 
established that investment banking and retail banking sectors had the largest Pillar I Capital allocations of capital 
(VaR and EL). The retail and investment banking sectors are more complex, with greater operational risk 
exposure, whilst support business units have a limited scope, scale, and complexity, and thus returned a lower 
Pillar I Capital charge, in line with expectations. Investment banking had a lower EL profile (low frequency-high 
impact losses), whereas retail had a higher EL profile, owing to the fact that the ILD profile has low-impact, high-
frequency losses. The paper compared the AMA and the TSA’s Pillar I Capital estimations and found that business 
unit Pillar I Capital charge ratios are circa to the EL in the TSA.  
 
2.4 Chapter Summary  
 
The literature discussed in this section considered arguments for and against the notion that with increasing 
complexity of the quantification approach of Pillar I Capital, financial institutions receive a capital reprieve to 
incentivise them to improve their management and measurement of operational risk through a lower Pillar I 
Capital charge. From the literature, we established that increasing complexities in financial institutions’ 
quantification of Pillar I Capital does not necessarily translate to a capital reprieve that entices financial institutions 
to advance their operational risk management and measurement. The reviewed literature discussed the simpler 
methodologies (BIA and TSA) regarding this issue. To the best of our abilities we could not find any work that 
was sufficiently comprehensive to include all four available operational risk quantification approaches (BIA, TSA, 
AMA, and SMA), in particular for the South African market. Thus, with the advent of the newly announced SMA, 
and the mixed findings cited above, we found a gap in the literature that conclusively addresses this issue for 
South African banks. The ensuing section details our research design and the methodology used in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter focuses on the methodology used in this study. It also details the quantification methods and their 
implementation in this study. Overall, the chapter highlights the process in calculating the Pillar I Capital reserves 
using the BIA, TSA, AMA, and SMA. The Pillar I Capital reserve benefit is thought to be the difference between 
any two calculated quanta using any method. This section aims to closely record all modelling processes and other 
related procedures. The chapter presents the process followed in performing the end-to-end calculation of the 
overall operational risk capital charge, using all four approaches. For the AMA, this includes the process followed 
in building the calculation dataset, selecting distributions, and calculating the ALD. We also conducted a technical 
review of the mathematical and actuarial concepts that informed our estimation methodology. 
 
3.1 The Basic Indicator Approach  
 
In the BIA, a fixed fraction of a bank’s annual three-year average positive GI was calculated to ascertain the 
operational risk Pillar I Capital charge. The BCBS (2006) defines GI as the net interest income plus net non-
interest income. In this thesis, the BIA formula used is as follows:  
 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = {∑ (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖 ∗ α )}𝑛𝑖=1 /𝑛      (3.1) 
 
Where GI is over a three-year period, for all instances where GI is positive, and α is an alpha factor of 15% (BIS, 
2006:145). 
 
3.2 The Standardised Approach  
 
The Standardised Approach’s GI comprises provisions, operating expenses, insurance earnings, plus any irregular 
items (Sundmacher, 2007). The GI was quantified for each individual BL, then aggregated to give a bank wide 
view. A fixed percentage of the bank’s annual three-year average positive GI was calculated for each BL to 
ascertain the operational risk Pillar I Capital charge. The beta was pre-determined, and its extent was dependent 
upon the perceived riskiness of a given BL, and the beta factors and their respective BLs used are detailed in Table 
3.1 hereunder:  
 
Table 3.1: The Standardised Approach Beta  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Lines  Beta Factors 
Corporate Finance 18% 
Trading and Sales  18% 
Retail Banking  12% 
Commercial Banking  15% 
Payment and Settlement  18% 
Agency Services 15% 
Asset Management 12% 
Retail Brokerage 12% 
23 
 
Source: BCBS (2006) 
 
In TSA, a zero GI value was used in all cases where there was negative GI. The key equation used is as per 
equation 3.1 where GI per BL is over a three-year period, and where GI is positive and β is a multiplicative factor, 
as detailed in Table 3.1 (BIS, 2006:145).  
 
3.3  The Advanced Measuring Approach  
 
In this section, we discuss the process used in implementing different methodologies to fit both the ILD and the 
Scenario Analysis data, including the combination of the different data elements. We also explain the 
incorporation of a dependence structure to reach the diversified capital numbers used in this thesis. The ILD is 
dominated by low-impact but high-frequency events. Thus, it informs the body of the loss distributions, whereas 
the low-frequency, high-impact events are considered in the Scenario Analysis, process that provides coverage of 
the tail risks. Separating the loss distribution into a body and tail ensures that the risk profile is captured accurately, 
without instabilities that might be caused by big losses, which are outliers. Different measures of accuracy, the 
consistency of the parameters, and the resulting capital were then taken into consideration when selecting the 
probability distributions. For some ORCs, there was no data to model the body of the distribution. In such cases, 
it was assumed that the bank was unlikely to experience high-frequency and low-impact events due to the nature 
of their business, and thus their risk profile was captured accurately from their scenario analysis data. In a case 
where the loss events that fall in the body were realised, they were deemed as being sufficiently covered by the 
capital from the scenario analysis data. 
 
3.3.1. Modelling Scenario Analysis Data 
 
In practice, scenario analyses are based on expert opinion, are forward-looking, and provide coverage for tail loss 
events, which are the low-frequency, high-severity theoretical events that a financial institution may not have 
experienced, but which could severely impact the bank’s solvency should they materialise. Baud, Frachot, and 
Roncalli (2003) initiated the Duration Approach and their seminal paper was used in this. The Duration Approach 
was later enhanced by Steinhoff and Baule (2006) and Peters and Hübner (2009). A Scenario Analysis using the 
Duration Approach aims to construct subjective loss distributions founded on experts’ business insights and their 
overall experience. This Duration Approach allows for subjective distribution inputs to be produced in a manner 
that is easy for business experts to understand (qualitative). This method improves the quality of inputs, owing to 
the fact that experts have a better understanding of the questions asked. This ultimately provides more reliable, 
consistent, and accurate Scenario Analysis data for the VaR estimates. Alderweireld, Garcia, and Léonard (2006) 
advocate at least three observations comprising of (𝑘) and (d), to be furnished by the business professionals to 
attain more reliable, consistent, and accurate Pillar I Capital.  
 
Table 3.2: Scenario Analysis  
 
Duration 1 in 1 1 in 10 1 in 20 1 in 50 
Estimated Loss Amount k1 k2 k3 k4 
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The average waiting period or time-span between two operational risk losses beyond a certain loss quantum or 
amount (k) is defined as an Average Duration. The financial institution’s business experts must provide an 
estimate quantum of (k) that would on average take (d) years for an operational risk event larger than the (k) 
quantum to occur. The subjective loss distribution is then constructed using the experts’ provided loss amounts or 
severities for each of the given durations.  
 
Figure 3.1: Scenario Analysis and the Duration Approach 
 
   
Source: Frachot et al. (2003). 
 
The (d) is exponentially distributed with intensity ( λ ∗ (1 − F(x)) ). The average duration between losses 
exceeding x is given by:  
𝐸(𝑑) =  
1
𝜆∗(1−𝐹(𝑥))
.                 (3.2) 
This equation defines the meaning of a duration. In Peters and Hubner (2009), the parameter λ that is used, 
corresponds to the mean of losses experienced annually. Parameterisation of the duration buckets comprises the 
solution to the following optimisation problem:  
θ̂ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑗 (𝑑𝑗 −
1
(1−𝐹(𝑥𝑗,𝜃))
)
2
𝑛
𝑗=1                      (3.3) 
 
The weighting wj is equivalent to the inverse of the variance estimate of the duration (i.e. wj = 1/d2) with the mean 
value dj. These inter-arrival times (durations) are assumed to follow the exponential distribution. Thus, the 
theoretical formulation of the Weighted Least Squares Method indicates that using these weights yields the best 
linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of the parameters. The above optimisation equation minimises the sum of the 
squares of the deviations of the value d ̂j calculated using the data elicited from the experts, with the standard 
(predetermined/given) dj value, and the parametric distribution that has a minimal distance from the subjective 
distribution will be chosen to model the risk estimated by experts and provide the capital charge at 99.9% (Peters 
& Hubner, 2009). Overall, Scenario Analysis data is the most challenging data for which to estimate the 
distributional parameters, since it has only a few big data points, and thus the data is not comprehensive. Also, 
within the data, there is a lot of uncertainty due to the way in which the data might be arrived at. Thus, one has to 
ensure that the resulting parameters are robust, less biased, and are able to capture the uncertainty incorporated in 
the estimates. To achieve this balance, the steps below summarise the process followed in estimating the 
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distributional parameters for scenario data. In the Duration Approach, the standard durations used in our thesis 
were one in one year, one in 10 years, one in 20 years, and one in 50 years. After the severity points of each 
duration were estimated, the tail distributions were considered in determining a distribution that would best 
describe the scenario loss distribution. These durations were used as inputs to a weighted least-squares 
approximation to determine the distribution that would best describe the severity estimates while incorporating 
up to 10% variance above and below the loss amounts for each point. The incorporation of this variance was to 
ensure that a possibility of error in the estimates of approximately 20% was accounted for. The numerical 
technique (wLSA) used to determine the parameters of the loss distribution was repeated 1,000 times (and 
averages were calculated and adjusted by one standard deviation for conservatism). At each step of the 1,000 
iterations, the amounts of the severity buckets were re-sampled randomly, up to 10% above and up to 10% below 
the original inputs. The resulting Average Least Squares amount was used as a degree of GoF and to select the 
best fitting distribution. For the best fitting distribution, the average (with the variance of the parameter added) of 
the 1,000 parameters was used as the final parameter. 
 
3.3.2 Modelling Internal Loss Data  
 
There following three major steps were performed to clean the data: exclusions; inflation adjustment; and 
treatment of multiple impact losses.  
 
Exclusions: - Data exclusions were performed to ensure that the relevant data was used to measure accurate capital 
for operational risk.  
 
Inflation adjustment: - Inflation adjustment was performed to all the losses on a cumulative basis,  to ensure that 
the loss amount reflected the current value and impact. The formula used to calculate cumulative inflation was: 
 
 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                (3.4)                                                            
 
where 𝑛 is the number of years and 𝑟𝑖 is the annual average inflation rate for year 𝑖.  
 
Treatment of multiple losses: - These losses had to have the same event type (Event Risk Category Level I), the 
same event ID (the financial impact ID will be different), and have occurred within the same business unit. If the 
resulting loss amount was greater or equal to the modelling threshold (stated as R10k in line with the ILD 
collection threshold), then it was included in the calculation dataset.  
 
Aggregated losses: These losses were excluded from the model dataset.  
Type of Impact: In the database, entries ranged from losses to gains or near misses. During the 
building of the modelling dataset, gains and near misses were excluded, and 
only losses were included.  
Financial status: In the loss database, a status was applied to each entry according to the general 
ledger classification, that is, whether the entry was settled, provisioned, cost, 
or an estimate. For modelling purposes, estimates and near misses were 
excluded from the modelling data set.  
Credit risk: Losses that had a credit component were referred to as boundary events. In 
the construction of the modelling dataset, these losses were excluded.  
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Market risk:  Losses related to market risk were included in the modelling data set.  
Modelling period: Losses falling out of the prescribed modelling period were excluded. The 
reference date used for this was the date of settlement or provisioning. That 
is, the date at which the loss amount entered/impacted the general ledger.  
Insurance: Losses related to the insurance business activities were not included in the 
calculation data set, as these businesses are not regulated under the Banks 
Act.  
 
In modelling the ILD, we began by considering the different types of distributions for modelling both the 
frequency and the severity of the losses. Observed operational risk events occur in an asymmetrical manner, with 
inter-arrival times. A couple of distributions are considered suitable for modelling arrival times. The most 
commonly used distribution is the Poisson distribution. The Poisson distribution parameter is the mean (which is 
also equivalent to the Poisson distribution’s variance). When random variables (Poisson) that are independent 
when summed together, the outcome remains a Poisson random variable. When the two component Poisson 
random variables’ mean parameters are summed, the mean of the two components is aligned to their individual 
means. The Poisson distribution is typically used to count the number of relatively rare, but open-ended events 
(no upper limit on number of events). The Poisson distribution is deemed ideal in modelling operational risk 
frequency, owing to its acknowledged inherent analytical qualities (Mignola & Ugoccioni, 2006). The Poisson 
distribution was utilised to model the occurrences of loss observations that were  realised in a given interval of 
time or space. The Poisson PDF (a discrete distribution) with parameter () takes the following form:  
 
𝑝  (  𝑥   ;       ) =  
𝜆𝑥
𝑥!
        𝑒−𝜆,   𝑥 =    0, 1, 2, …        (3.5) 
 
Operational loss data has a data truncation point, which is aligned to the minimum loss collection threshold (BIS, 
2006). Severity distributions were largely established to model data that had no collection thresholds. To redress 
this we used Shevchenko and Temnov’s (2009) assumption that the loss amounts followed a continuous PDF of 
f (k, θ) [CDF F (k, θ)], with (k, ∞). Secondly, we also assumed that the data was reported from the loss amount L 
and above. From these assumptions, we then derived the link between the left truncated severity distribution and 
the intensity of the Poisson process. The left truncated severity distribution is given by:  
 
𝑓𝐿   (  𝑘  , 𝜃  ) =  
𝑓 ( 𝑘 ,𝜃 )
1−𝐹 ( 𝐿 ,𝜃 )
          (3.6) 
Poisson intensity is given by 
 
𝜋(𝐿, 𝜃,) = [1 − 𝐹(𝐿, 𝜃)]          (3.7) 
This is equivalent to the frequency of the losses with a severity that is equal or above the threshold L. Shevchenko 
and Shevchenko and Temnov’s (2009) provide the derivation for the adjusted frequency of the losses greater than 
L, using the above truncated PDF. The presence of such collection thresholds (L) presents a dilemma when 
modelling loss severity. Such distributions should not essentially be utilised in their native state in cases where 
the data has been truncated (Ergashev, 2008). The use of parametric distribution helps deal with issues of finite 
limited data and non-parametric estimation procedures that are not robust. Hence, fitting a parametric distribution 
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to empirical data enables the prediction of the probability of the loss events that are beyond the limited empirical 
data sets, and this improves the accuracy of estimated parameters.   
 
In the estimating the parameters, more robust methods of fitting the empirical data are needed to ensure that the 
parameters accurately reflect the data properties. Owing to the general limited number of operational risk 
observations or data (truncated), the choice of a fitting procedure is important as not all the procedures can produce 
reliable parameter estimates. Different robust methodologies have been proposed in the literature, but not all these 
methodologies work for every distribution and data sets. The MLE is an analytic method to fit operational risk 
events to a statistical distribution, and it determines distributional parameters that have an estimated maximum 
likelihood of modelling the loss data (density function). Let 𝑋 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛)  be the vector of n loss 
severities that are iid from an unknown family of distributions. Suppose that it is assumed that the unknown family 
of distribution for X belongs to a known family of distributions with probability density function f that has a vector 
of parameters, 𝜃 = (𝜃1, 𝜃2 ,   ⋯ , 𝜃𝑚  ), then the likelihood function is given by:   
 
𝐿𝑛(𝜃; 𝑋) =  ∏ 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝜃).
𝑛
𝑖=1           (3.8) 
It must be noted that the true distribution (with its parameters) of 𝑋 is unknown, and the purpose of the likelihood 
function is to find the parameters of the known distribution that can be as close as possible to those of the unknown 
distribution of the empirical data set. A certain level of convenience can be achieved by working with the 
logarithm of the likelihood function 𝐿𝑛. Thus we have a log-likelihood;  
 
𝑙 ( 𝜃  ;   𝑋 ) =  log  (  𝐿𝑛  (  𝜃  ;   𝑋  )  )   =    ∑   log (  𝑓  (  𝑥𝑖  ;   𝜃  )  )
𝑛
𝑖=1      (3.9) 
In simplistic numerical terms, the parameter estimates can be obtained by finding parameters that maximise the 
function:  
𝜃 =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
1
𝑛
∑
𝜕𝑙(𝜃;𝑥𝑖)
𝜕?̂?𝑖
𝒏
𝒊 = 𝟏 )  =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑙(𝜃; 𝑋)𝒏𝒊 = 𝟏 )                   (3.10) 
An interesting property of the MLE is that of consistency. The MLE is consistent, but not necessarily unbiased. 
That is, as the data size increases, the estimated parameter converges to the true parameter. Thus, the bias in the 
parameters estimated vanishes/decreases as the size of the data set increases. In instances were one fails to correct 
for the truncation point in fitting a probability distribution, this results in an underestimation of parameters, and 
by extension, Pillar I Capital.  
 
A GFT was then performed in comparing the empirical distribution (from the data) to that of the fit. Statistical 
GFTs essentially identify the calibre of the fit between estimated distributions and observations. Statistical GFTs 
are hypothesis-testing methods that reject or fail to reject a distribution, depending on the score relative to the 
critical values. The null hypothesis was rejected in all instances where the score was above the critical value (data 
comes from the distribution under investigation). The GFT’s task was also seen as showing how well a chosen 
distribution typically matches the empirical data t when compared to a set of alternative candidate distributions, 
or showing whether or not the chosen distribution is good enough (for specific purposes). Thus, the test was also 
used as a measure of GoF to rank order candidate distributions. Where (𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑛) is a set of ordered observed 
losses such that 𝑘1  ≤ 𝑘2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑘𝑛. Under the goodness-of-fit we have a null hypothesis (H0) and an alternative 
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hypothesis (H1). In this case, given the empirical distribution function 𝐹𝑛 and specified parametric distribution 𝐹 
hypothesis testing can be done.  
 
𝐻0: 𝐹𝑛 ∈ 𝐹 and 𝐻1: 𝐹𝑛  ∉ 𝐹                      (3.11) 
Under the null hypothesis, it was assumed that 𝐹 ∿  𝑈 ( 0 , 1 ). Thus, were the 𝑝 value is smaller than the specified 
significance level 𝛼 , the null hypothesis was rejected (Moscadelli, 2004). In 1954 Darling and Anderson 
pioneered one of the most renowned tests developed from the Cramer von Mises test, namely the Quadratic 
Anderson-Darling Test. A key referral paper in this regard is Leherisse and Lavaud (2014). The test emphasises 
the right and left tails rather than the body of the distribution. This accentuates the tail-end fit, which is ideal for 
operational risk. In this thesis, the Anderson-Darling (AD) Test is calculated in the following manner:  
 
𝐴2  =  − 𝑛 − ∑
2 𝑖 − 1 
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1 [ln ( 𝐹 ( 𝑥𝑖  ) )  −  ln ( 1 −  𝐹 ( 𝑥𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖 ) )]                      (3.12) 
 
Where xi’s are non-decreasing ordered empirical data observations (x1  ≤  x2   ….. ≤  xn) n is the sum total of the 
number of data points. The AD was chosen for its specific relative advantages, such as: it is not reliant on the 
manner in which the loss events are binned; and its ability to accentuate the fit of the distribution’s tail. For an 
extensive review of the Quadratic AD tests Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006) and Ergashev (2008) are seminal 
works.  
 
The other test used in the thesis is the KS Test, which is a measure of the overall fit or the absolute extremum 
distance between the empirical and the theoretical distributions, while assigning equal weight to each data point, 
or the difference between the mentioned distributions at (k), where k is a point on where the fit is worst. The KS 
Test is calculated in the following manner:  
 
𝐷𝑛
−  = max|𝐹(𝑘) − 𝐹𝑛(𝑘)|                      (3.13) 
𝐷𝑛
+  = max|𝐹𝑛(𝑘) −  𝐹(𝑘)|                       (3.14) 
 
Where ki’s are non-decreasing ordered empirical data observations (k1  ≤  k2  ….. ≤  kn); n is the total number of 
observations. An advantage of the KS Test is that the statistical distribution of the test under the null hypothesis 
is independent of the actual population distribution. Knuth (1998) notes that where the data sample is limited, the 
test tends to accept erroneous models. The disadvantages of the KS are that: it is limited to continuous 
distributions; being a general measure of overall fit, the tail is less sensitive compared to the body; and it has 
limited ability in detecting evidence of violation of the hypothesis. The key advantages of KS are: it is not ILD 
binning methodology dependent; and CDF probability tables and critical value tables are commonly accessible. 
The KS Test is utilised in Dutta and Perry (2006); Mignola and Ugoccioni (2006). 
 
The GFTs essentially assess the absolute difference between the estimated distribution and the empirical 
distribution. The GFT is sensitive to the number of parameters being estimated and the sample size. Two severity 
distributions can pass GFTs, but to support distributional selection the AIC was utilised. In cases where no decisive 
verdict was made on the ideal distribution, the AIC was used to reach a conclusive decision. Essentially ,AIC is a 
selection method that uses the models’ comparative results at differing levels of confidence. The other approaches 
considered were the: Schwarz Bayesian; Criterion Likelihood Ratio; and Corrected AIC (AICc). The AIC chooses 
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a distribution that minimises the Kullback Leibler distance between the actual data set and the model. Robert 
(2001) states that the AIC focuses on the least possible parameters, and thus chooses the model that best fits the 
data on this basis. The AIC is not an absolute measure, but it is a relative measure used in the comparison of two 
models; it expresses no independent opinion regarding the fit between the empirical (data) and theoretical 
distribution. To select a model (distribution), the decision must be made in conjunction with output from the other 
GFTs. The AIC was calculated in the following manner:  
 
𝐴𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  2 𝑥 –  2 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔 ( 𝑆 )                   (3.15) 
 
Where S is the max value of the probability function for the distribution, and x is the number of parameters in the 
distribution (Afambo, 2005). The AIC penalises the model that has an increased quantum of parameters. In this 
way, the AIC facilitates avoidance of over-fitting the data (Tsai & Hurvich, 1988).  
 
In summarising our ILD modelling methodology, two thresholds were considered in fitting ILD. The first was the 
lower threshold that is informed by the loss collection threshold. The second threshold was the upper threshold 
and was predominantly determined by the starting point of the scenario data, due to lack of comprehensive data 
in the ILD. The Hill Plot and mean excess plots were used to confirm the appropriateness of the threshold point. 
In the case where the upper threshold from the scenario data resulted in an unstable parameter fitting in the body, 
exploratory data analysis tools were used to determine the appropriate upper threshold. Once the upper threshold 
was determined, the process of estimating the distributional parameters started. The estimation of parameters for 
loss data is summarised as follows. The upper threshold was determined from the scenarios’ data (severity of the 
one in one), and confirmed by using the exploratory data analysis tools. The annual average frequency was 
determined from the data, and a Poisson distribution was assumed. All the body distributions were fitted using the 
MLE (including a non-parametric distribution and that being the Gaussian kernel). The distributions for the body 
fitting include: Nonparametric-Gaussian; Lognormal; Weibull; Gamma and Exponential. The estimated 
parameters fell within the 95% confidence interval of the parameters derived from the empirical dataset. This 
ensured that the resulting parameters were not too far off from the empirical dataset, as the main focus of the body 
of the distribution was on the high-frequency and low-impact losses. Distributions that had parameters that were 
within 95% confidence interval of the empirical parameters went through the GoF tests. The GoF was conducted 
on each distribution in order to determine the best fitting distribution. The test included the KS and AIC. That is, 
for a distribution to be selected at this stage, it must have passed the KS test at 5% level of significance and have 
the lowest AIC (of the distributions that passed the KS test). Capital stability was also considered as a measure of 
whether the capital output is realistic for the selected model. Bootstrap and Stress testing was carried out on the 
best fitting distribution to support the selection by looking at the robustness and stability of the data, including the 
sensitivity of the profile to the changes in the upper threshold. In cases where the use of MLE to estimate the 
distributional parameters did not produce realistic results, a second estimator was used and that estimator was the 
truncated quantile matching estimator (TQME). Also, for some distributions or complex datasets, the KS was not 
a reliable measure of goodness-of-fit due to the normality assumption. Thus, the composite AD test with 1000 
simulation and 5% tolerance level was considered as an alternative. 
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3.3.3 Combining Scenario Analysis and Internal Loss Data 
  
A number of different methodologies for combining different operation risk data elements have been proposed. 
Most of these methodologies are variations of EVT. The reason for using different variations of EVT is due to the 
traditional EVT techniques requiring comprehensive data (that may not necessarily include extreme tail data 
points). In operational risk, this becomes a serious challenge, since units of measure may not necessarily have 
comprehensive data that can aid determining the attachment point (where the body ends and the tail starts). To 
address this issue, we determined the attachment point from the scenario data by using a combination of statistical 
analyses (where data was available). The aim was to ensure that the regulatory Pillar I charge covered the exposure 
sufficiently. The density function of the EVT model used in this thesis is:  
 
𝑔(𝑥) =  {
(1 − 𝜙𝑢)𝑓𝑏(𝑥) for 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥1
𝜙𝑢𝑓𝑡(𝑥) for 𝑥 > 𝑥1
                    (3.16) 
Where 𝑓𝑏 and 𝑓𝑡  represent the density function of the body and tail with the attachment point of 𝑥1. The body is 
informed by the loss data, whereas the tail is informed by the scenario data. The integral of the density function 
𝑔(𝑥) must be one. To ensure that the integral of the above density function is one, we used an estimate of the 
above density function as; 
 
𝑔 = (1 −  
1
̂𝑏
) 𝑓𝑏 +
1
𝑏
𝑓𝑡                     (3.17) 
In this work we implemented the following steps for combining the data elements in a case where the unit of 
measurement (UOM) has both a body and tail. In generating the ALD let ̂  =  ̂𝑏 + ̂𝑡  be the overall frequency 
of the class, where ̂𝑏  and ̂𝑡  represent the frequency of the body and tail respectively. Suppose that the 
parameters of the body and tail distributions are given by 𝜃1 and 𝜃2. The algorithm below uses the Monte Carlo 
simulation methodology with 𝑀 simulations. 
 
- generate a vector of random numbers 𝑵𝒃~𝑷𝒐𝒊(̂𝒃 ) and 𝑵𝒕~𝑷𝒐𝒊(̂𝒃 ); 
- generate the iid losses 𝑿𝟏, … , 𝑿𝑵𝒃 from the body distribution 𝒇𝒃; 
- generate the iid losses 𝑿𝟏, … , 𝑿𝑵𝒕  from the tail distribution 𝒇𝒕; 
- calculate the aggregate loss 𝒀 =  ∑ 𝑿𝒏𝑵𝒏=𝟏 , with 𝑵 =  𝑵𝒃 + 𝑵𝒕; and 
- repeat the above steps 𝑴 times independently to obtain the ALD and estimate the VaR at the 99.9%. 
 
When we extricated the loss amount from the distribution 𝑔, appropriate adjustments were made to the probability, 
due to the truncation. Thus, the probability was given by 𝑝∗ = 𝑝 (𝐹(𝐻) − 𝐹(𝐿)) + 𝐹(𝐿). That is, for the tail 
distribution, 𝐿 = 𝑢 and 𝐻 = Inf and 𝐹 = 𝐹𝑡 , and for the body distribution, 𝐿 = 10000 and 𝐻 = 𝑢 and 𝐹 = 𝐹𝑏. 
Thus, this set up only applied to cases where there was sufficient data for modelling. In cases where there was 
insufficient data, the scenario data was used to calculate the capital charge. 
 
3.3.4 Diversification  
 
A correlation is a measure of association, whereas dependence is a measure of the presence or absence of a 
relationship between variables. We began by focusing on ways of calculating correlations, and established that 
this could be achieved through the Pearson Correlation; Spearman Correlation; Kendall’s Tau; Variance-
Covariance Approach, and the Copula Approach. Due to the nature of the complexities of the processes (and 
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systems, etc.) in a financial institution, a single event may be a result of a failure of the interrelated processes. In 
such a case, the event may, in the different interrelated environments be realised as a different event type. This 
means that dependence can be taken into consideration when modelling operational risk. Not all major losses 
occur at exactly the same time in all business operations. Ideally, the ILD should be used to establish such 
correlations, but due to a lack of loss data, most South African banks are unable to obtain reasonable estimates 
for correlations between and within its BLs for its loss variables. In this thesis, we remedied this by eliciting ELD 
to extract correlations’ scores. This process ensured that the resulting estimates of correlations were sound, stable, 
and accounted for the stress environment, uncertainty, and bias. To ensure that biases were mitigated in the 
correlation matrix, a standardisation was applied. 
 
Table 3.3: Standardisation of Correlation Coefficients  
 
Correlation coefficient (ρdb) Used correlation coefficient(ρ) 
ρdb < 0% ρ = 0.10 
0 < ρdb ≤  25% ρ = 25% 
25% < ρdb ≤ 50% ρ = 50% 
ρdb ≥ 50% ρ= ρdb 
 
In this manner, standardisation ensures that there are no zeroes or negative coefficients in the correlation matrix 
while maintaining 10% minimum. The matrix was then confirmed to be positive definite (that the quadratic form 
was greater than zero). It was appropriate to use a positive definite matrix in the Markowitz Variance-Covariance 
Approach, owing to the fact that the quadratic form of the covariance matrix that the correlation matrix was 
derived from can be considered as the multi-variance, and a variance cannot be negative, it can only be zero for 
point mass distributions. In this thesis, we implemented a Variance-Covariance Approach. In this approach, the 
correlation matrix was not part of the simulation, but was used to diversify the already simulated results.  
 
3.3.5 The Standardised Measurement Approach  
 
The SMA combines a bank’s idiosyncratic loss data (historical loss experience) that captures the bank’s relative 
sensitivity to operational risk with a simple standardised measure of operational risk (BI). The BI comprises of a 
financial statement proxy (reflecting business volume) of the overall risk exposure. The key assumption for this 
approach is that banks with similar BI value a stable relationship between operational loss exposure and the BI. 
The BI largely uses the same aspects of the profit and loss (P&L) used in calculating the GI, except for the fact 
that it uses absolute values for all components; it includes P&L (banking book) and also includes other operating 
expenses. The BI is constructed by taking the sum of the three-year average for each BI item: 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐼𝐿𝐷𝐶)𝐴𝑉𝐺 +  𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑆𝐶)𝐴𝑉𝐺 +
 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐹𝐶) 𝐴𝑉𝐺                      (3.18) 
 
Where AVG is a three-year average and the  
 
𝐼𝐿𝐷𝐶 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛 [ 𝐴𝑏𝑠 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒); 2.25% 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ]  𝐴𝑉𝐺 +
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝐴𝑉𝐺                       (3.19) 
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𝑆𝐶 =  𝑀𝑎𝑥 [ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ; 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 ┤  𝐴𝑉𝐺 +
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [ 𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ;  𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 ]  𝐴𝑉𝐺                     (3.20) 
 
𝐹𝐶 𝐴𝑉𝐺 =  𝐴𝑏𝑠 (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃&𝐿 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐴𝑉𝐺)  +  𝐴𝑏𝑠 (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃&𝐿 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐴𝑉𝐺).                               (3.21) 
 
To estimate the BIC, the BI is multiplied by marginal coefficients that escalate with the magnitude of the BI. 
According to the Basel text, a firm’s ILD is considered in the measurement of Pillar I’s regulatory reserve in the 
ILM. The ILM:  
𝐼 𝐿 𝑀 =  𝐿 𝑛  (  exp ( 1 )  −  1 + (
𝐿𝐶
𝐵𝐼𝐶
)
0.8
)                     (3.22) 
The BIC and the LC is computed by multiplying 15 by the average annual operational risk losses over a 10-year 
period. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary  
 
In the AMA, parametric models were imposed to generate the annual loss distribution through a convolution of 
the annual loss severity and frequency distribution. These data elements were also used in varying degrees and 
forms in the AMA modelling process. The following steps were executed:  
 
a. the construction of risk classes;  
b. data preparation;  
c. model selection; c 
d. calculating the aggregated loss distribution;  
e. obtaining the VaR and the EL; and 
f. calculating the total diversified capital.  
 
Scenario Analysis data and ILD were used in this thesis as direct inputs into the capital calculation. Statistical 
tests were performed to determine the best fitting distribution for the data. Tests such as the KS Test and the AIC 
were considered to determine the GoF. The following steps were followed to fit the ILD. For each class within 
the ORC, the mean annual number of losses was calculated and was assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. 
The method of MLE was used to fit four distributions, namely the Lognormal, Weibull, Generalised Pareto, and 
Burr distribution. To determine the GoF, the KS Test was used. To discern or pick out the best fitting distribution, 
the AIC was used, as this criterion ensured that the issues of over-fitting were considered and that all distributions 
were equal. Thus, using the AIC ensured that the GoF was not just a result of the distribution having more 
parameters. Hence, the distributions were assessed at the same level, irrespective of their number of parameters. 
Using the AIC selected distribution, further tests were conducted to ensure that the fit was robust and stable. The 
tests for robustness and stability included bootstrapping test and stress testing respectively. If the selected 
distribution (along with the fitted parameters) failed one of the three tests, i.e. the KS Test, bootstrapping, or stress 
testing, the ILD was not used to model the class. Based on the results of the statistical tests, the appropriate model 
was selected. A simulated annual ALD was obtained from which variance, percentiles, means, and medians were 
ascertained. Classes were then aggregated into operational risk cells assuming independence between each class 
profile. In the diversification process, the Variance-Covariance Approach was used to diversify VaR. The 
following chapter presents the input data, the results, and their respective analyses. It also demonstrates the degree 
to which research goals were attained.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INPUT DATA AND RESULTS 
 
The preceding chapter detailed the fundamental design and the methodology followed in the quantification of the 
Pillar I Capital charge. The focus of this chapter of the thesis is on data, its sources, and the systems used to hold 
or manipulate the data. This chapter also documents our results for each operational risk quantification 
methodology, and gives a detailed analysis of each instance. A major obstacle to this study has been the fact that 
historical operational risk data is often not publicly available. As a consequence, uniform historical operational 
risk data on which Pillar I Capital reserves can be quantified, is often deficient. In this study, the subject bank’s 
business activities and operational risk profile was extensively evaluated in a bid to identify and quantify the input 
requirements for each approach. However, we do acknowledge that this thesis is written in a way that anonymises 
the South African financial institution under study in an effort to protect its identity, owing to the sensitivity of 
the information.   
 
4.1 The Basic Indicator Approach  
 
In the BIA, a prescribed proportion of a bank’s annual, three-year average, positive GI is calculated to ascertain 
the operational risk Pillar I Capital charge (BIS, 2006:145). Table 4.2.1 details the BIA input data used in this 
thesis. This information was secured from the subject bank’s income statements and balance sheet statements for 
the five-year period covering 2013 to 2017. The GI metric grew by 8% in 2016, and 4% in 2017 (year-on-year 
basis). 
 
Table 4.2.1: Balance Sheet Statement and Income Statement Inputs (BIA) 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total assets   749 594 000    809 313 000    925 726 000    966 022 000    1 055 321 795  
interest-earning assets   594 715 000    652 194 000    724 080 000    775 092 000       844 085 340  
Gross Income      40 580 611      43 272 988      45 632 408      49 929 175         51 686 970  
Interest income, of which:     38 121 277      40 745 686      60 288 523      68 912 015         75 298 535  
Income from financial & operational lease          147 867           165 761           157 669           144 966         12 210 247  
Interest expenses; of which:     16 901 691      17 784 609      36 403 622      42 486 496         47 674 490  
Abs value of net interest income      21 219 586      22 961 078      23 884 901      26 425 519         27 624 045  
Dividend income          199 389           175 882           427 951           194 272               719 174  
Fee & commission income     15 950 197      14 570 555      15 626 940      19 968 953         20 408 778  
Fee & commission expenses                     -                        -                        -          3 282 606            3 054 465  
Net profit (loss) on fin ops (trading book)       2 696 507        3 081 061        3 591 250        3 808 425            3 979 607  
Other operating income          514 932        2 484 412        2 101 366        2 814 612            2 009 831  
 
The output data or results of our BIA calculation are displayed in Table 4.2.2 (a). The risk exposure reflected in 
Table 4.2.2 (a) was estimated as a three-year average, positive GI. It amounted to R49.2 billion for the period 
under consideration. The Pillar I Capital reserve estimated using the BIA was found to be R7.38 billion (obtained 
through calculating a 15% factor of the risk exposure). The RWA in Table 4.2.2 is an off-balance sheet exposure 
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that has been weighted according to the institution’s inherent risk. Risk-weighted assets are utilised in computing 
a Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).  The Basel Committee’s guidelines state that the use of a Risk-Weighted 
Approach is the preferred methodology, which provides a single metric to compare financial institutions across 
different landscapes. It also provides a means in which off-balance sheet exposures are incorporated into capital 
adequacy calculations as well as financial institutions not being prevented from carrying low-risk liquid assets. 
The RWAs calculated using the BIA amounted to R92.3 billion for the three-year period ending 31 December 
2017 (achieved by calculating a 12.5 multiple of the capital requirement). 
 
Table 4.2.2 (a): Gross Income, Alpha Factor, and Capital Requirements (BIA) 
 
  31-Dec-15 31-Dec-16 31-Dec-17 Risk Exposure 𝛂 Factor  Capital Requirement   RWA 
Financial 
Institution 
46 079 566  49 929 175  51 686 971       49 231 904            15%                   7 384 786  92 309 820  
 
 
Table 4.2.2 (b): Risk Exposure, Capital Requirements (BIA), and RWA 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Gross Income    40 580 611    43 272 988    46 079 566    49 929 175    51 686 971  
Risk Exposure                   -                      -      43 311 055    46 427 243    49 231 904  
Capital Requirements                    -                      -        6 496 658      6 964 086      7 384 786  
RWA                   -                      -      81 208 228    87 051 081    92 309 820  
% Change from Prior Year 
     
Gross Income - 6.63% 6.49% 8.35% 3.52% 
Risk Exposure                   -                      -                      -    7.19% 6.04% 
Capital Requirements                    -                      -                      -    7.19% 6.04% 
RWA                   -                      -                      -    7.19% 6.04% 
 
Risk Exposure, capital requirements, and RWAs for 2013 and 2014 were not captured in Table 4.2.2 (b) owing to 
the fact that they require a bank’s annual three-year average, positive GI, which could not be secured as at the 
date of this thesis. However, Table 4.2.2 (b) does reflect the percentage step change of each metric from its prior 
year estimate. In the even period, the  GI grew 8.35% in 2016, ahead of Pillar 1 capital, which grew by 7.19%. In 
2017 the growth in GI slowed to 3.52%, whilst the increase in Pillar 1 capital eased slightly to 6.04%. This reflects 
the smoothing effect of basing the BIA Pillar I Capital calculations on risk exposure, which is a three-year average, 
as opposed to basing the calculation on a single year’s GI. Our results show that using a single year as opposed to 
a three-year average would result in volatility in Pillar I Capital, which might give rise to financial instability in 
the bank’s balance sheet. We also found that the rate of change on a year-on-year basis for RWAs and the BIA 
Pillar I Capital charges was in tandem with the rate of change in the risk exposure. The use of RWAs provides a 
single metric to compare financial institutions across different landscapes (inter-bank). However, when RWAs 
are computed using various estimation approaches for the same financial institution, the resultant profile is the 
same as that which is observable in the Pillar I Capital profile, owing to the fact that RWAs are a straight line 
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multiple of Pillar I Capital (intra-bank). Therefore, the inclusion or exclusion of an RWA analysis in this thesis is 
of no consequence in meeting our defined objectives, as stated in Chapter 1. 
 
4.2 The Standardised Approach  
 
In TSA the BLs of the entity under study were mapped according to the Operational Risk Basel Business Lines. 
The relative GI contribution per BLs was: agency services (0%); payment and settlement (0%); asset management 
(1%); retail brokerage (1%); corporate finance (8%); commercial banking (22%); trading and sales (30%); and 
retail banking (37%). This profile is in line with expectations, and is deemed generic to Southern African 
commercial banks where the GI is skewed towards these four market offerings. Table 4.3.1 details TSA’s input 
data (first three columns) used in this thesis, stratified according to BLs. This information was secured from the 
subject bank’s income statement and balance sheet statements for the three-year period covering 2015 to 2017. 
The Pillar I Capital charge was calculated using TSA, and was found to be R6.91 billion for the three-year period 
ending 31 December 2017 (also depicted in Table 4.3.2). The largest disparity between the GI earned per BL and 
the resultant regulatory capital calculated was in retail banking, which, although it earned 43% of the total GI, it 
nevertheless carries 37% of the Pillar I Capital reserve. This is as a result of the fact that although it makes the 
largest contribution to the GI, the beta factor applied to it was a minimum of 12%. The largest contradictory 
position between the GI earned by a BL and the resultant regulatory capital charge, is in trading and sales, which 
although it earned 23% of the GI it nevertheless carries 30% of the capital charge. Notwithstanding that it makes 
the second largest contribution to the GI, the beta factor applied to it was a maxima 18%. This is aligned to the 
realisation that trading and sales is a more complex business, and potentially has a high operational risk exposure 
compared to that of retail banking. 
 
Table 4.3.1: Gross Income, Beta Factor, and Capital Requirements (TSA) 
 
  31-Dec-15 31-Dec-16 31-Dec-17  Risk Expos  Beta Capital  RWA  
Corporate Finance 2 325 755  3 154 099  3 777 326  3 085 727  18% 555 431  6 942 885  
Trading & Sales     8 930 278  12 013 584  13 498 263  11 480 708  18% 2 066 528  25 831 594  
Retail Brokerage        742 115  718 897  675 921   712 311  12% 85 477  1 068 466  
Commercial Banking   11 066 913  9 948 906   9 420 304  10 145 374  15% 1 521 806  19 022 577  
Retail Banking   20 452 379  21 509 387  21 790 670  21 250 812  12% 2 550 097  31 876 218  
Payment & 
Settlement 
       101 014  75 665      95 582        90 754  18%  16 336    204 195  
Agency Services        145 632  215 647    163 900   175 060  15%  26 259    328 237  
Asset Management        736 380  755 136   828 449       773 322  12% 92 799   1 159 983  
Insurance     1 579 100  1 537 855   1 436 556   1 517 837  0% -         -    
Gross Income  46 079 566  49 929 175  51 686 971  49 231 904    6 914 732  86 434 155  
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Graph 4.3.2: Gross Income, Capital Charge and RWAs (%) 
 
For the period under consideration, corporate finance and trading and sales’ average GI over the three-year period 
grew by 28% and 23% respectively, whilst commercial banking’s average GI over the same period regressed by 
8%. Retail banking business (and invariably its operations), although apportioned the largest share of the 
operational risk regulatory capital charge (37%), has on average grown by 3% over the same period. This 
contradicts the trading and sales trend, which grew its average GI by 23% against an apportioned ORC charge 
weighting of 30%. Overall, the RWA estimated using TSA amounted to R86.4 billion for the three-year period 
ending 31 December 2017. 
 
Table 4.3.3: Basic Indicator Approach and the Standardised Approach Results  
 
   Risk Exposure    Ave Beta    Capital Requirements   RWA  
Basic Indicator Approach  49 231 903 949.33  15%     7 384 785 592.40   92 309 819 904.99  
Standardised Approach  49 231 903 949.33  15%    6 914 732 370.24   86 434 154 627.97  
Percentage Change (%) - - - 6.37% - 6.37% 
 
Internationally active banks can choose to practice the following approaches listed in ascending order of risk 
sensitivity: the BIA or TSA. Both TSA and the BIA methodologies are predetermined by the central bank (and 
the Basel Committee). On introduction of TSA (post BIA), the Basel Committee positioned TSA as a more 
complex estimation method of Pillar I Capital charges. To entice financial institutions to advance their risk 
management and measurement methods, financial institutions were thought to benefit from a reduced regulatory 
capital reserve charge as they move from the least (BIA) complex approach to the most convoluted quantification 
approach (TSA). Internationally active financial institutions ultimately need to make a large investment to move 
from the BIA to TSA. However, the value of such a move from the BIA to TSA has not been immediately obvious 
on the back of both approaches having an average Beta of 15%. Sundmacher (2004) deliberates on alternate key 
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risk leading indicators at length, and criticises using GI as a key operational risk indicator as used in the BIA and 
TSA. In his work, the decision as to which estimation approach to choose is regarded as a comparison between 
the data collation costs and the developmental costs, in contrast to the benefits of operational risk capital reprieves. 
Sundmacher (2007) considers “trading volumes” as a better suited KRIs in comparison to GI. However, in contrast 
to Sundmacher, the BIS justifies its choice of GI owing to an absence of substantiation of superior risk sensitivity 
of other pointers or indicators, reduced arbitrage possibilities, simplicity, and comparability. Sundmacher (2004) 
established that there is a possibility of gaming under both TSA and the BIA. Sundmacher (2007) points out that 
the key differentiator between TSA and the BIA is that on the whole, a reduction in the operational risk capital 
charge is attainable when a negative GI of a BL is compensated by other BLs, while in BIA, no such freedoms 
are permissible. Notwithstanding this identified set-off afforded by TSA, the Pillar I regulatory reserve cannot be 
negative to the extent that it leads to a set-off against credit or market Pillar I Capital charges. The author further 
highlights that bank’s structure is a significant influencing factor in choosing between the BIA and the TSA. He 
finds that neither the simplistic BIA nor TSA results in a regulatory reserve reprieve against the background of 
contingency plans, or commercial insurances, or diversification benefits. This part of our research aimed to build 
on Sundmacher’s (2007) work by testing one instance of the BIA’s operational risk Pillar I Capital charge against 
that of TSA. This was an attempt to capture and show the financial benefit that South African banks could 
potentially attain should they opt to move from the BIA to TSA. The explicit benefit for this case of data analysed 
for the period ending 31 December 2017 was found to be BIA-TSA (R7 384 785 592.40 - R6 914 732 370.24 = 
R470 053 222.16 (6.37% reduction)). We found that there is considerable enticement for banks to move from the 
BIA to TSA. Although the TSA’s risk sensitivity is questionable, as shown by the counter-intuitive movements 
in the GI and Pillar I Capital reserves for retail banking and trading and sales, it nonetheless has the potential to 
award South African banks a Pillar I regulatory reserve benefit of 6.37% in comparison to a BIA Pillar I regulatory 
reserve charge. 
 
4.3 The Advanced Measurement Approach’s Input Data   
 
The model developed in this study employs four data elements in the implementation of the AMA. These data 
elements were used in varying degrees in the AMA modelling process. The Scenario Analysis data and ILD  are 
a direct feed into the AMA engine. The relevant ELD and ILD were also used to build the correlation matrix that 
was used to determine the diversification benefit. In modelling operational risk, a financial institution must choose 
a structure that accurately reflects its business model and risk profile. This structure is called the UOM, and it 
heavily influences the banks’ modelling methodology. The UOM is the lowest level at which the regulatory capital 
is calculated before being consolidated at group level. In this study, the UOM that was used is BL level and Basel 
event-type category-level one. The bank under study has three front line or customer-facing businesses. The three 
front line business units were treated as BLs, these business units are CIB, retail and business banking (RBB), and 
wealth. A combination of a business unit and an event type is referred to as an ORC or a cell, and in this study we 
had 22 ORCs. Thus, in this thesis, UOM and ORC are used interchangeably.  
 
4.3.1 Scenario Analysis Durations and Percentiles (Inputs) 
 
To cover both the body and the tail, Risk management and risk measurement scenarios where constructed 
respectively. Risk management scenarios (percentile buckets) were used as an alternative to fit the ILD. They 
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were largely informed by the loss experience within the ORC, and were expressed in terms of percentiles (e.g. 
5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%) and frequency. To determine the frequency and severity for the Risk Management 
Scenarios, the ILD was cleaned. The upper cut-off point for the percentile buckets was the one in one severity 
bucket (attachment point), which was the lowest severity for the tail risk profile (starting from zero). The final 
step was to calculate percentile severities and frequencies using data. The data set was only used in instances were 
they numbered 100 points or more, in order to qualify for usage in the risk management scenario modelling 
process. By default, the ILD was used to model the body profile if the data sets were sufficient and suitable, 
otherwise percentile buckets were considered. Risk measurement scenarios provided coverage for the high 
severity, low frequency losses. The risk measurement buckets are built to capture the major risk(s) or potential 
catastrophic events. These are ideally estimated through risk identification, where the major risk(s) based on the 
Business Environment and Internal Control Factor’s (BEICF) products, business processes, and other 
idiosyncratic factors are determined. The risk measurement buckets considered were one in one year, one in 10 
years, one in 20 years, and one in 50 years (Shevchenko, 2011). For the purpose of this research, hypothetical 
estimates giving the average inter arrival time between losses were generated for all classes. The hypothetical 
scenarios were created from the data set using the bootstrapping method. The full set of durations and percentile 
input buckets that were considered during the modelling process in this thesis are presented in the table below: 
 
Table 4.4.1: Scenario Analysis Duration Buckets and Percentiles  
 
  Risk Measurement Buckets Risk Management Buckets 
Class ID 1-in-1 1-in-10 1-in-20 1-in-50 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Freq 
Class01 1 800 000 11 500 000 17 000 000 25 500 000 - - - - - - 
Class02 2 000 000 5 500 000 15 000 000 30 300 000 - - - - - - 
Class03 1 500 000 7 000 000 25 000 000 50 000 000 - - - - - - 
Class04 8 500 000 17 640 000 29 400 000 58 800 000    2 892 5 171 9 230 26 222 382 916 101.0 
Class05 5 000 000 30 000 000 50 000 000 100 000000 3 676 5 320 16 296 99 982 647 079 22.5 
Class06 7 160 000 20 000 000 40 000 000 83 000 000 3 783 11 182 36 876 120 022 267 482 84.6 
Class07 1 600 000 20 000 000 40 000 000 83 000 000 - - - - - - 
Class08 2 500 000 10 000 000 22 000 000 39 500 000 - - - - - - 
Class09 3 930 049 21 280 000 33 090 400 106 400000 617 1 648 8 401 46 378 659 364 16.5 
Class10 5 320 000 21 280 000 27 025 600 106 400000 739 2 372 9 533 27 193 188 013 453.5 
Class11 2 350 000 7 500 000 10 000 000 40 000 000 3 299 16 420 53 975 180 929 1 043291 43.0 
Class12 1 288 888 5 280 000 10 560 000 15 840 000 3 245 8 662 24 909 85 121 277 005 33.0 
Class13 1 500 000 4 500 000 7 500 000 20 000 000 2 804 4 664 10 341 28 289 161 243 83.8 
Class14 1 600 000 4 800 000 9 600 000 14 400 000 - - - - - - 
Class15 855 000 3 300 000 6 600 000 13 200 000 - - - - - - 
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Class16 124 285 12 023 802 24 047 605 48 095 210 2 888 5 538 12 646 27 017 81 771 93.5 
Class17 840 000 8 200 000 38 350 000 76 700 000 2 999 5 446 10 419 28 739 162 990 36.8 
Class18 3 000 000 3 900 000 10 000 000 13 500 000 5 763 21 954 63 090 190 008 988 047 36.2 
Class19 10 000 000 40 000 000 50 000 000 100 000000 - - - - - - 
Class20 3 370 000 17 100 000 28 500 000 42 000 000 - - - - - - 
Class21 10 000 000 69 000 000 100 000000 200 000000 - - - - - - 
Class22 4 500 000 15 000 000 26 000 000 47 880 000 749 1 669 3 618 10 534 46 836 5 879 
 
4.3.2 Internal Loss Data Input Data  
 
The BCBS (2011) specifies that in order for a financial institution to be granted or sanctioned use of the AMA the 
financial institution has to have collected five years’ worth of ILD. A loss collection threshold imposed by the 
bank must be incorporated into the modelling process, and the ILD should incorporate all of the bank’s happenings 
and operational risk exposures. In this thesis, the ILD used was retrieved from the subject bank’s SAS eGRC 
database. The ILD covers a ten-year period ending December 2017, and is treated on a gross loss basis. 153,606 
data points were obtained from the ILD base. In this thesis, we found the data-set to be largely dominated by ELs 
and lacking in ULs (tail events). The subject bank’s loss profile, as shown in Table 4.5.2, was found to be in line 
with the profiles depicted by the quantitative impact studies (2001 and 2002 Loss Data Collection Exercises 
(LDCE) carried out by the Basel Committee’s Risk Management Group (RMG). In the LDCE, 89 financial 
institutions’ operational risk loss data profiles were analysed, and the RMG established that the respective loss 
experiences for the 89 banks failed to show the full range of potential losses that they could suffer. This limitation 
further exacerbates the need for techniques such as Scenario Analyses, and the EVT, which lengthen the 
distribution curve past the individual bank’s loss experience, or that of the 89 banks (see also RMG’s 2001 and 
2002 LDCE reports). After cleaning and exploring the raw input data, only 22 579 (14.7% of the raw data set) 
data points formed part of the calculation datasets. The exclusions made relate to the removal of aggregated losses, 
gains, recoveries, estimates, near misses, credit related losses, and all losses incurred in the insurance arm of the 
firm. This cleansing also included such tasks as missing data imputation, data normalisation, identification of 
extreme outliers, and dimensionality reduction. The bank under study, as a member of the big four banks, uses 
more traditional, high-quality data sources, such as its internal systems and credible ELD vendors. The data in 
these files was found to be well-defined and structured. The result of each cleansing step is presented in Table 
4.4.2: 
 
Table 4.4.2: Internal Loss Data Profile  
  No. Losses Removed Removed Losses Balance Loss Reduction per Step 
Entire Data Set - - 153 606 100.00% 
Remove Recoveries 14 965 9.70% 138 641 90.30% 
Remove Gains 6 131 4.00% 132 510 86.30% 
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Remove Near Misses 3 358 2.20% 129 152 84.10% 
Remove Estimates 238 0.20% 128 914 83.90% 
Remove Credit Related 4 147 2.70% 124 767 81.20% 
Remove Aggregate Losses 14 876 9.70% 109 891 71.50% 
Remove Insurance Related Entity (1) 81 0.10% 109 810 71.50% 
Remove Insurance Related Entity (2) 434 0.30% 109 376 71.20% 
Remove Insurance Related Entity (3) 751 0.50% 108 625 70.70% 
Filter dates 154 0.10% 108 471 70.60% 
Remove Negative Losses 2 492 1.60% 105 979 69.00% 
Get Unique Losses - - 105 979 69.00% 
Remove Duplicates 8 520 5.50% 97 459 63.40% 
Apply Multiple impacts - - 97 459 63.40% 
Apply 10k threshold on inflation adjusted 74 880 48.70% 22 579 14.70% 
 
In assessing the 22 579 losses, 92% (count) of the data was classified as external fraud (EF) (73%), execution, 
delivery and process management (17%), and clients, products, and business practices (CPBP) (1.76%). 
Approximately 89% of the ILD (in Rand value) was classified as EDPM (47%), EF (35%), and CPBP (6.95%). 
The lion’s share (85%) of the data points is of a value less than R160 000 (74% is from RBB).* The cumulative 
inflation table used for loss adjustments is presented hereunder. 
 
Table 4.4.3: Cumulative Inflation Table  
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cumulative 
Inflation 
84.6 72.4 54.6 44.3 38.4 31.8 24.8 18.1 11.3 6.4 0 
 
The operational risk profiles of the individual business units in the subject bank change loss amounts are increased. 
The percentage of operational risk losses in RBB is 74%, but their value is insignificant relative to a business unit 
like CIB, whose number of losses is miniscule, but their Rand value is just over 60%. This by implication would 
mean that CIB, relative to RBB, is potentially more exposed to tail events. Survivorship bias inherent in the 
analysed data and its potential impact on the VaR calculation was considered, but was deemed to be beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 
Table 4.4.4: ILD Loss Profile Per Risk Type  
 
 
B D S F C P B P D P A E P W S E D P M E F I F T o t a l 
Count     606.00      398.00      202.00      334.00    3 949.00    16 580.00      507.00    22 576.00  
Sum        82.70      246.50         30.20         80.40    1 668.00      1 254.10      185.10      3 546.90  
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Average          0.14           0.62           0.15           0.24           0.42              0.08           0.37              0.16  
Median          0.03           0.05           0.03           0.08           0.03              0.02           0.07              0.03  
Maximum          8.40         55.40           8.20           4.60       176.00         190.00         11.80         190.00  
Annual Average Loss          7.90         23.50           2.90           7.70       158.90         119.40         17.60         337.80  
Std. Deviation          0.50           3.90           0.80           0.50           3.90              1.70           1.00              2.30  
Coefficient of Variation          3.70           6.30           5.20           2.00           9.30           22.70           2.60           14.50  
 
Table 4.4.4 shows that EF (R1.3billion) and execution, delivery, and process management (R1.6 billion) also 
house the largest tail events suffered by the subject bank, i.e. R190Mn and R176Mn respectively. Similarly, the 
standard deviation for both event types is substantial in both instances, closely followed by CPBP. The table below 
presents detailed ILD loss profile results per year (in millions of Rand): 
 
Table 4.4.5: ILD Loss Profile Per Year 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017   
Count 3 279  3 562    2 232   1 399    1 728      2 879    1 760     1 571    1 674   1 626    866.0  
Sum   562.4    284.9    299.9    172.9     203.1      308.6    161.8       380.1    394.1    667.2    111.9  
Average       0.2        0.1        0.1        0.1         0.1           0.1        0.1           0.2        0.2        0.4        0.1  
Median   0.034  0.03    0.027   0.025     0.022       0.019    0.020      0.022    0.023   0.021       0.02 
Maximum     55.4      14.1      37.2      17.0       29.3         54.2        9.2         96.4      69.5    190.0      15.0  
Std. Deviation       1.9        0.4        1.2        0.8         1.0           1.3        0.4           2.8        2.4        6.6        0.8  
Coefficient of Variation     11.2        4.9       8.6        6.7         8.8         11.9       4.9         11.7      10.3      16.1        6.1  
Average : Median Ratio      5.0        2.7        4.9       4.9         5.3           5.6       4.6         11.2      10.3      19.1        6.6  
Max : Average Ratio   322.9    176.7    276.6    137.4     249.6       505.3    100.5       398.6    295.3    463.1    116.1  
 
Overall, the nature of the ILD shows a familiar picture of operational risk losses in general (lognormally shaped). 
Even though there are 22 576 losses, most of the ORCs don’t have enough loss data for modelling purposes. Thus, 
in considering the ILD data, we found that the kind of profile it describes little about the ULs and more about the 
ELs.  
 
4.3.3 External Loss Data  
 
The consortium data used in this thesis is pooled data submitted by member banks to a central repository. The 
ELD utilised in this thesis was sourced from the Operational Risk eXchange Association (ORX). The key benefit 
of syndicated ELD is the fact that it is not impacted by media reporting biases (Shevchenko, 2011). The data was 
initially cleansed and most of these cleansing steps are similar to those performed in the ILD. The ELD was used, 
in part, as a key validation of alignment between the subject bank’s operational risk loss profile and that of other 
international banks. Table 4.4.6 shows operational risk data sourced from ORX for the ten-year period ending 31 
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Dec 2017. ORX’s data has 8 Basel II BLs and two additional ORX specific BLs, and private banking and corporate 
items. The amounts reflected in the table are in Euros and were not adjusted for inflation. All credit-risk-related 
events were removed, in line with BCBS’ detects. The collection threshold for losses of operational risk nurture 
is €20k. Table 4.4.6 ultimately reflects an operational risk loss profile that is similar to the ILD used in this thesis. 
The top three event types that ORX members have suffered are: EDPM; EF; and CPBP. The EDPM makes up 
38.2% of the ELD in Rand value, and 36.7% in number of losses (count). Retail banking has suffered 43.3% of 
the total number of EDPM losses. Retail banking suffered 84.4% of the EF losses found in the ORX database. 
 
Table: 4.4.6 Operational Risk ORX Loss Profile 
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Source: Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX) 
  
BDSF CPBP DPA EDPM EF EPWS IF Total
Count 29 493 79 1 001 390 259 30 2 281
Sum 2 519 633 36 316 839 6 079 668 79 608 010 27 836 774 20 800 020 2 445 240 175 606 184
Average 86 884 73 665 76 958 79 528 71 376 80 309 81 508 76 986
Median 90 839 69 357 73 661 77 812 65 515 77 606 79 042 74 418
Max 144 217 147 389 142 070 147 517 147 143 147 622 144 525 147 622
Std Dev 34 840 41 799 34 285 37 528 34 745 39 740 37 920 38 291
Vol 0.40                   0.57                   0.45                   0.47                   0.49                   0.49                   0.47                   0.50                   
Count 1 382 1 552 111 19 643 1 006 1 073 188 24 955
Sum 104 778 413 118 135 715 8 208 693 1 514 340 201 75 991 791 82 515 541 14 651 686 1 918 622 040
Average 75 817 76 118 73 952 77 093 75 539 76 902 77 935 76 883
Median 74 125 75 682 71 033 74 923 72 180 75 369 75 050 74 791
Max 147 515 147 577 144 833 147 669 147 377 147 614 147 396 147 669
Std Dev 38 468 40 514 37 885 37 040 32 922 38 230 38 287 37 254
Vol 0.51                   0.53                   0.51                   0.48                   0.44                   0.50                   0.49                   0.48                   
Count 2 229 18 676 2 023 37 923 66 699 15 729 7 314 150 593
Sum 169 429 659 1 454 988 871 152 924 804 2 930 004 825 4 917 728 028 1 261 561 130 47 091 249 10 933 728 566
Average 76 012 77 907 75 593 77 262 73 730 80 206 6 439 72 604
Median 72 101 75 497 72 647 73 663 68 196 80 059 4 393 69 524
Max 147 561 147 670 147 528 147 670 147 666 147 668 147 482 147 670
Std Dev 37 846 35 851 34 364 34 577 32 468 36 427 14 425 36 627
Vol 0.50                   0.46                   0.45                   0.45                   0.44                   0.45                   2.24                   0.50                   
Count 468 4 248 128 9 305 8 264 718 486 23 617
Sum 35 738 601 329 466 466 10 231 305 730 066 926 637 373 354 56 404 185 37 363 844 1 836 644 681
Average 76 365 77 558 79 932 78 460 77 126 78 557 76 880 77 768
Median 72 522 76 744 79 544 77 004 74 335 78 313 74 463 75 735
Max 146 312 147 670 146 518 147 670 147 591 147 459 147 476 147 670
Std Dev 38 155 38 680 35 314 37 192 34 459 38 866 39 491 36 651
Vol 0.50                   0.50                   0.44                   0.47                   0.45                   0.49                   0.51                   0.47                   
Count 249 135 11 1 906 840 54 51 3 246
Sum 20 477 800 9 851 832 827 865 148 018 218 59 115 699 3 717 974 3 888 539 245 897 927
Average 82 240 72 977 75 260 77 659 70 376 68 851 76 246 75 754
Median 81 589 64 524 63 625 73 703 65 205 60 407 76 044 71 458
Max 147 128 147 013 147 176 147 464 147 264 145 089 138 919 147 464
Std Dev 38 644 38 729 47 103 34 696 29 823 42 111 34 405 34 362
Vol 0.47                   0.53                   0.63                   0.45                   0.42                   0.61                   0.45                   0.45                   
Count 208 441 35 8 317 655 251 61 9 968
Sum 16 883 685 33 346 007 2 427 725 656 264 609 50 216 438 20 112 364 4 779 245 784 030 073
Average 81 172 75 615 69 364 78 906 76 666 80 129 78 348 78 655
Median 77 287 71 623 58 952 76 489 71 267 77 996 81 912 76 042
Max 147 135 147 651 143 777 147 658 147 098 147 623 146 625 147 658
Std Dev 36 058 37 986 39 600 36 103 30 101 39 725 38 379 35 954
Vol 0.44                   0.50                   0.57                   0.46                   0.39                   0.50                   0.49                   0.46                   
Count 190 1 051 25 4 211 126 270 91 5 964
Sum 14 229 081 82 130 099 1 617 348 327 861 044 9 579 846 20 288 097 6 936 326 462 641 841
Average 74 890 78 145 64 694 77 858 76 031 75 141 76 223 77 572
Median 71 417 77 158 60 303 76 001 68 919 74 964 70 434 75 784
Max 145 964 147 536 146 635 147 627 146 601 147 171 147 504 147 627
Std Dev 36 271 37 682 38 043 36 643 37 657 39 008 43 822 37 071
Vol 0.48                   0.48                   0.59                   0.47                   0.50                   0.52                   0.57                   0.48                   
Count 147 6 294 23 3 716 635 1 245 480 12 540
Sum 10 591 355 498 159 751 1 572 808 287 989 006 49 266 990 97 861 633 37 704 357 983 145 900
Average 72 050 79 148 68 383 77 500 77 586 78 604 78 551 78 401
Median 68 659 80 041 67 159 74 276 75 793 78 943 76 390 77 409
Max 147 601 147 604 142 105 147 589 147 509 147 660 147 487 147 660
Std Dev 34 799 39 402 38 618 33 976 34 591 39 256 41 457 37 659
Vol 0.48                   0.50                   0.56                   0.44                   0.45                   0.50                   0.53                   0.48                   
Count 169 635 326 1 623 425 2 675 84 5 937
Sum 13 437 087 51 255 801 26 646 781 125 453 048 33 951 550 213 907 717 6 159 178 470 811 162
Average 79 509 80 718 81 739 77 297 79 886 79 966 73 324 79 301
Median 73 708 82 501 83 153 75 682 75 470 81 205 74 192 79 494
Max 146 990 147 494 147 208 147 593 146 858 147 457 144 244 147 593
Std Dev 37 950 38 216 37 204 37 816 32 758 39 512 39 634 38 309
Vol 0.48                   0.47                   0.46                   0.49                   0.41                   0.49                   0.54                   0.48                   
Count 5 071 33 525 2 761 87 645 79 040 22 274 8 785 239 101
Sum 388 085 314 2 613 651 381 210 536 997 6 799 605 887 5 861 060 470 1 777 168 661 161 019 664 17 811 128 374
Average 76 530 77 961 76 254 77 581 74 153 79 787 18 329 74 492
Median 73 207 76 415 73 276 74 797 68 942 79 740 5 193 71 553
Max 147 601 147 670 147 528 147 670 147 666 147 668 147 504 147 670
Std Dev 37 887 37 371 35 140 35 746 32 704 37 273 33 819 36 848
Vol 0.50                   0.48                   0.46                   0.46                   0.44                   0.47                   1.85                   0.49                   
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4.4 The Advanced Measurement Approach’s Results  
 
In this section we consider a single class to demonstrate the process discussed in Chapter 3. Below, exploratory 
data analysis tools are used facilitate understanding of the ILD profile for the class under consideration. From the 
summary of the ILD in the table below, and the mean excess plot, it is evident that the ORC is dominated by 
medium losses with a couple of big losses, i.e. the two biggest losses (R86m and R26m) contribute 66% of the 
total losses. Also, comparing the loss profiles that include losses that are less than R10,000 it can be seen that they 
have a negligible contribution, i.e. there are 335 losses that are less than R10,000 and they contribute less than 
1% (0.76%) of the total. Thus, the focus is on the profile that qualifies for modelling. 
 
Table 4.5.1 : Loss Profile of Operational Risk Class  
 
 All Losses  Losses >=10000 
Count 879 544 
Sum 174 573 844 173 249 497 
Mean 198 605 318 473 
Median 18 197 55 556 
Max 86 644 105 86 644 105 
Std. Deviation 3 087 545 3 921 280 
Skewness 26.0 20.5 
Kurtosis 710.5 439.8 
Coefficient of Variation 15.5 12.3 
Frequency 97.7 60.4 
 
 
Figure 4.5.1 : Mean Excess Plot  
 
From the mean excess plot above, the ORC contains multiple profiles. Thus, to produce reliable and reasonable 
capital numbers, the profile has to be divided into body and tail. Unfortunately the loss data tail does not have 
enough losses to capture the nature of the true operational risk exposure for this ORC. Thus, the scenario experts 
have to use the tail loss data and their business knowledge to develop their perception of the tail risk. For them to 
properly assess the risk, they need a starting point, a point that divides the body and tail. It can be suggested that 
the attachment point be chosen somewhere between the R500k and R1 million range. From Figure 4.5.1 it is 
45 
 
evident that the profile above the R500k mark only has four points. The recommended attachment point would 
have to be R1 million (with a -25% and +25% range). The hypothetical scenario created from the data set is 
provided in the table below. In this case, the bootstrapping method that was used to build the duration buckets is 
estimated as follows: one in one of R1 million; one in 10 of R11.7 million; one in 20 of R23.1 million; and one in 
50 of R40 million. Having elicited all the relevant input data, the first step is to fit the ILD with the upper threshold 
given by R1 million. The following distributions were used to fit the ILD that represents the body: Lognormal; 
Weibull; Gamma; and  Exponential.  
 
Table 4.5.2 : ILD Fitting Results  
 
 Lognormal Weibull Gamma  Exponential Guassian 
Fitting Method MLE MLE MLE MLE Kernel 
Scale 10.581 51435.178 0.339 80411.132 0.333 
Shape 1.322 0.678 154036.279 0 0 
MLH -6613.62 -6603.775 -6600.377 -6626.923 -760.445 
AIC 13231.239 13211.55 13204.755 13255.846 1522.889 
pValue 0.095 0.127 0.321 0 0.984 
KSStat 0.053 0.05 0.041 0.124 0.019 
Decision Accept Accept Accept Reject Accept 
95% CI of Empirical 
Parameters 
Within Outside Within Within Within 
 
From the above table, it is evident that the non-parametric distribution had the best fit. The parameters of the 
Weibull distribution were not within the 95% confidence interval of the empirical data. Thus, the indication is that 
the distribution was rejected even though the it passed the KS test. Of the other three distributions that passed the 
KS Test, they were taken through the AIC test, which shows that the Gaussian non-parametric distribution was 
the best fit. The Gamma distribution was penalised by the AIC, and thus it is the third choice even though it fitted 
better than the Lognormal (graphically). This is also confirmed by the Log-log plot. It is important to understand 
the stability, reasonability, and consistency of the capital of three main distributions. To do that we ran the 
bootstrap test and a sensitivity analysis for the three distributions. 
 
Table 4.5.3: Lognormal and Gamma Distribution Capital Stability 
 
Bootstrap Results Scale Shape Location VaR Decision 
Lognormal 0.55796 3.20107 0 3.8018 Accept 
Gamma 26.71689 9.49902 0 5.43984 Reject 
 
From the table above, it is evident that the Gamma distribution failed the bootstrap test, as the volatility of its 
parameters was greater than 25%. In Table 4.5.3 above, this instability cannot be noted, as only the VaR is 
highlighted. When fitting the scenario data, the Weighted Least Squares method was used to fit the tail 
distributions. The distributions that fitted include the following: Lognormal; Weibull; Generalised Pareto; 
Generalized extreme value; Loglogistic; LogGamma: and Burr. The detailed fitting methodology and the technical 
details were documented in Chapter 3. In Table 4.5.4 the fitting results for the scenario data are presented along 
with the capital estimates. 
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Table 4.5.4 : Scenario Fitting Results 
 
Distributions  Scale Shape  wLSA EL VaR 
GPD 16626547.615 0.235 0.00433 4 687 385 155 628 548 
Weibull 14044234.988 1.006 0.00560 3 177 460 84 167 082 
Lognormal 16.362 1.017 0.00645 5 028 308 148 272 128 
LogGamma 370.982 0.061 0.00764 2 836 103 512 133 980 196 186 
Burr 616298.391 8062514229577.270 0.04841 2 448 227 682 43 909 917 389 
GEV 18430309.802 -0.045 0.38606 4 946 876 96 056 590 
Loglogistic 11735894.456 1.801 0.41541 3 278 041 167 523 941 
 
As is evident in the table above, using the wLSA it is noted that the GPD is the best fit for the given scenario data. 
To confirm this decision, we looked at a supporting decision-making tool to ensure that the resulting capital 
numbers were stable, reasonable, realistic, and provided sufficient coverage for the risk profile assessed by the 
business experts. To understand the stability of the distribution, we considered the parameters of all the fitting 
distributions. Significant volatility could indicate the possible instability for certain distributions, given the profile. 
It should be noted that the Burr distribution showed significant instability with regard to its shape parameter. The 
volatility experienced by the Loglogistic distribution’s parameters was consistent, and this was due to its nature. 
Thus, there are hardly any parameters that fall outside the interquartile range, even though it is wide. Taking the 
four distributions with ALDs that showed a certain level of stability and calculating the value at risk at different 
percentiles, we obtained the results presented in Table 4.5.5 below. It provides an indication of the  four 
distributions’ capital stability, which was largely influenced by the specific distributions’ characteristics and the 
far percentiles, which were mostly unstable due to the uncertainty attached to them. The GPD has been consistent 
throughout all the tests presented above. It provided a reasonably stable and realistic capital that provides good 
coverage of the expert-assessed risk. In combining the body and tail to obtain the overall capital for the ORC, the 
method described in Chapter 3 was used. In this case, we looked at the using the Gaussian kernel for the body and 
the GPD for the tail. The table hereunder presents a combined risk profile from both the scenario data and the 
ILD. 
 
Table 4.5.5 : Combined Risk Profile  
 
 Distribution EL VaR 
ILD Risk Gaussian 6 234 179 10 349 676 
Scenario Risk GPD 4 651 935 159 005 272 
Class Risk EVT 10 886 424 164 104 552 
 
 
4.4.1 Cleansing Results of the Internal Loss Data 
 
In this section the  entire portfolio of results will be discussed. The nature of the ILD discussed in the preceding 
chapter shows a familiar picture of operational risk losses in general, a high number of small losses, and a low 
number of large losses. Even though there were 22,576 losses, most of the ORCs didn’t have sufficient loss data 
for modelling purposes. For a class to be modelled using ILD, it must have at least 25 data points. Most of the 
ORCs that qualified for modelling failed the stringent robustness and stability tests due to a few extremely large 
losses, compared to the ORCs complete profile. In fitting the ILD, we were typically concerned with 
regularisation, i.e. optimising a model’s ability to predict data points out-of-sample. This required finding an 
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optimal fit of the modelled relationship that neither underfitted nor overfitted the data. In underfitting, the model 
would not capture the underlying trend of the data sufficiently. Overfitting, on the other hand, means that the 
model describes random errors or noise in the data, rather than the underlying relationship. Though not explored 
in this thesis, to prevent underfitting, the approaches most strongly associated with redressing this are non-
parametric, non-linear approaches that flexibly fit the models to the data, such as forests and neural networks. 
Overfitting is mitigated in several ways, most importantly via the practice to calibrate models by running them on 
randomly chosen data sub-samples in a cycle of training, validation, and testing. The table hereunder provides a 
summary of the robustness testing results. 
 
Table 4.5.6: KS Test, Bootstrapping and Stress Testing Ratio 
 
  ILD Final KS Test Bootstrapping CoV Stress Testing Ratio   
Class ID Count Distribution P-Value KS Result A B Result VaR Result Results 
Class01 8 None                   Reject 
Class02 7 None                   Reject 
Class03 26 None                   Reject 
Class04 487 Lognormal   0.1763  Accept   432.80    44.19  Reject       0.5544  Accept Reject 
Class05 154 Lognormal   0.5081  Accept     13.70    16.60  Accept       0.3845  Accept Accept 
Class06 684 None                   Reject 
Class07 11 None                   Reject 
Class08 2 None                   Reject 
Class09 86 Weibull       143.87    21.68  Reject       0.5015  Accept Reject 
Class10 2350 Lognormal   0.1215  Accept       7.52      5.28  Accept       0.8537  Accept Accept 
Class11 398 Weibull         43.22    10.35  Reject       0.8403  Accept Reject 
Class12 251 Lognormal   0.4512  Accept       2.10      9.08  Accept       0.7608  Accept Accept 
Class13 447 Lognormal   0.8187  Accept       5.72    10.31  Accept       0.8190  Accept Accept 
Class14 47 Weibull   0.2955  Accept     78.89    32.73  Reject       0.5325  Accept Reject 
Class15 45 Weibull       103.01    25.38  Reject       0.4403  Accept Reject 
Class16 671 Lognormal   0.5469  Accept     14.79    11.14  Accept       0.6641  Accept Accept 
Class17 204 Gpd   0.9295  Accept     31.57    10.32  Reject       0.4729  Accept Reject 
Class18 339 Weibull   0.8976  Accept     21.22      7.66  Accept       0.8490  Accept Accept 
Class19 0 None                   Reject 
Class20 0 None                   Reject 
Class21 0 None                   Reject 
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Class22 15779 Lognormal   0.0000  Reject            -            -    Reject                -    Reject Reject 
 
There were 15 classes that had sufficient data for modelling, i.e. equal to or more than 25 data points. Of these, 
six classes passed all the robustness tests (Class 10, 12, 13, 16, and 18). Most ORCs in the study failed the 
conducted bootstrapping tests, owing to the fact that they had heavy tails in their profiles, that is, they had two 
profiles within an ORC. Most ORCs were dominated by small losses (ELs), with only a select few losses, which 
could be regarded as tail events (ULs). This infusion of two profiles in one ORC, or this polarisation cause that 
during the resampling (bootstrap), the volatility becomes too large, in particular for the scale parameter. In 
conducting the second robustness test, i.e. stress testing, the ORCs that had two profiles in one tended to have less 
sensitive parameters. These two-in-one ORCs resulted in notable instabilities during the fitting process, owing to 
the MLE better fitting the body of the distribution relative to the tail. This consequently results in the stressed 
VaR ratio exceeding the arbitrary quantum of two when considered relative to the absolute VaR (unstressed). No 
distributions could be selected for all ORCs that did not have any data points or that had limited data points. This 
was true for ORC 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20 and 21. The operational risk cells in this study mapping ILD amounted 
to 22, this number was within the range of AMA practice – there were instances were some ORCs had few data 
points relative to other cells (making them insufficient for modelling). The Basel Committee (BIS, 196:165) 
advocates for balance between volume of historical loss data per ORC and the level of granularity of each class 
(especially in instances where an LDA is being used). The insufficiency in the number of observations resulted in 
the ILD playing a constrained role in the determination of the AMA Pillar I Capital charge. For further research 
some sensitivity and impact analysis on the ideal number of ORCs (and thus by extension the level of granularity) 
has to be done to better understand this aspect of the thesis. 
 
4.4.2 Scenario Analysis Data (Risk Measurement or Duration Buckets) 
 
The Duration Approach forms the basis for the estimation of scenario data. In fitting the data from the risk 
measurement scenario data, the estimated severity amount for each duration was randomised, and two 
distributions were fitted using the wLSA. Table 4.5.7 gives the parameters of the best fitting distribution and the 
respective wLSA. 
 
Table 4.5.7: Weighted Least Squares and Distributional Parameters (Risk Measurement or Durations) 
 
Class ID Loss Count Aggregation Final Distribution A B Freq. wLSA 
Class01 8 MEA Lognormal 15.31664 0.92707 1.00 0.09706 
Class02 7 MEA Lognormal 15.14746 1.03888 1.00 0.78158 
Class03 26 MEA Lognormal 15.11151 1.30871 1.00 0.59659 
Class04 487 MEA + MAN Lognormal 16.40780 0.76427 1.00 1.02663 
Class05 154 MEA + MAN Lognormal 16.15129 1.12731 1.00 0.36873 
Class06 684 MEA + MAN Lognormal 16.33100 0.94932 1.00 0.84172 
Class07 11 MEA Lognormal 15.37771 1.42192 1.00 0.20956 
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Class08 2 MEA Lognormal 15.41734 1.04187 1.00 0.50847 
Class09 86 MEA + MAN Lognormal 15.88391 1.28436 1.00 0.80709 
Class10 2 350 MEA + ILD Lognormal 16.15010 1.17230 1.00 1.09341 
Class11 398 MEA + MAN Lognormal 15.32588 1.09439 1.00 1.20214 
Class12 251 MEA + ILD Lognormal 14.77021 0.92985 1.00 0.35461 
Class13 447 MEA + ILD Lognormal 14.78782 1.01143 1.00 0.97615 
Class14 47 MEA Lognormal 14.86810 0.83396 1.00 0.49078 
Class15 45 MEA Lognormal 14.27731 1.05197 1.00 0.59439 
Class16 671 MEA + ILD Lognormal 14.29312 1.78405 1.00 0.01532 
Class17 204 MEA + MAN Lognormal 14.89573 1.65337 1.00 0.45292 
Class18 339 MEA + ILD Lognormal 15.41412 0.57756 1.00 0.86347 
Class19 - MEA Lognormal 16.64637 0.89406 1.00 0.51501 
Class20 - MEA Lognormal 15.79959 0.90403 1.00 0.19191 
Class21 - MEA Lognormal 16.88346 1.11650 1.00 0.30370 
Class22 15 779 MEA + MAN Lognormal 15.84648 0.91923 1.00 0.59163 
 
Actual and potential loss systems where operational risk losses can occur within a bank were identified, and these 
amounted to 22 operational risk cells (ORCs). The Lognormal distribution for all 22 scenarios was found to have 
the best fitting distribution on the back of the specified fitting criteria and the frequency assumption of λ=1. This 
assumption is informed in particular by the fact that a high severity is often assumed to have a low frequency, 
otherwise high severities that occur at high frequencies will lead to bankruptcy. In Peters and Hubner (2009), the 
parameter λ that is used, corresponds to the average number of losses experienced in a year. However, using the 
average number of losses per year directly in a scenario, proved to have its own problems. Firstly, loss data is 
historical and might be related to different business environments rather than the one that is envisaged by the 
forecasts. Secondly, the ILD is not guaranteed to be a perfect reflection of the losses as there might be structural 
reporting biases and inaccurate time-stamping of losses, which can result to losses clustered around a single point. 
And most importantly, it results in instabilities when optimising the Weighted Least Squares function below, in 
order to obtain the parameters of the best fitting parametric distribution. That is, these scenarios are thought to 
consider losses that can have major impacts on the business and not merely the average day-to-day losses, thus, it 
is prudent to keep the annual average frequency standard low, and therefore the scenario frequency for durations 
has been set to 1/d. Other practitioners anchor the scenario data against a single severity duration data point when 
estimating modelling parameters. The ILD profile shows that the bank under study does not have sufficient losses 
to cause major impacts, and the scenario addresses this whilst also trying to be forward-looking in terms of these 
major risks. For further research, sensitivity and an impact analysis on the assumption of a Poisson parameter of 
one, has to be done to better understand this aspect of the thesis. The wLSA was used to fit the scenarios, see 
Table 4.5.7. The Lognormal distribution adequately estimated the tail characteristics of the ILD, owing to it being 
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an sub-exponential distribution. Additional work might be required to assess the selection of the Lognormal 
distribution ahead of the Burr, GPD, Weibull, the Pareto, and Gamma distributions in all instances. Further 
research might be needed to broaden the selection of distributions, such as exponential severity distributions and 
the non-parametric-Gaussian distribution (Snyman, 2011).  
 
4.4.3 Scenario Analysis Data (Risk Management or Percentiles)  
 
The presence of ILD signals the fact that one must consider those losses that are as a result of a bank being 
operational in a specific business environment. Hence, where the data failed all tests in Table 4.5.6 and was not 
included, a gap resulted in the profile. To circumvent this, the complete ILD was cleansed and five percentiles 
(these being 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%) were extracted, and the average frequency was calculated. The 
percentile buckets were parameterised only in instances where the ILD was not suitable to use as a direct 
modelling input. The follow classes utilised the risk management (percentile) buckets: Class 4; 5; 6; 9; 11; 17; 
and 22. 
 
Table 4.5.8: Least Squares Approximation and Distributional Parameters (Risk Management or Percentiles) 
 
Class ID Loss Count Aggregation Final Distribution A B Freq. LSA 
Class04 487 MEA + MAN Lognormal    9.32300   1.12850   101.05   0.01174  
Class05 154 MEA + MAN Lognormal  10.06114   1.84905     22.48   0.02044  
Class06 684 MEA + MAN Lognormal  10.52024   1.56550     84.57   0.00470  
Class09 86 MEA + MAN Lognormal    9.17344   2.25991     16.48   0.00585  
Class11 398 MEA + MAN Lognormal  10.92983   1.79159     43.05   0.00034  
Class17 204 MEA + MAN Lognormal    9.42942   1.16557     36.76   0.00835  
Class22 15 779 MEA + MAN Lognormal    8.33732   1.32905  5 879.0  0.00428  
 
To achieve this, the Least Squares Approximation (LSA) method was used to estimate the parameters of a 
distribution, given the data, and to characterise the data’s statistical properties. In brief, the LSA method 
approximates the parameters that minimise the sum of squares between the data’s subjective distribution (less 
than the first duration) and the parametric distribution.   
 
θ̂ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ (𝑃𝑗 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑗 , 𝜃))
2
𝑛
𝑗=1   4.1 
Pj is the probability of the loss of amount xj provided by the percentile extracts from the data, given the distribution 
being fitted and the whole subjective cumulative distribution. That is, the initial parameter θ was  estimated using 
the complete distribution. Pj was the pre-defined percentile (5%, 25%, 50%,75%, or 95%). The parameters from 
the distribution with the least sum of squares were used in building the aggregated loss distribution, along with 
the frequency parameter. 
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4.4.4 Diversification  
 
Due to the nature of the complexity of the processes (and systems, etc.) in a financial institution, a single event 
may be a result of a failure of the interrelated processes. In such a case, the event may, in the different interrelated 
, be realised as different event types. This means that dependence can be taken into consideration when modelling 
operational risk. Not all major losses occur at exactly the same time in all business operations. Ideally, the ILD 
should be used to establish such correlations, but due to the lack of loss data, most South African banks are unable 
to obtain reasonable estimates for correlations between and within its BLs for its loss variables. In this thesis, we 
remedied this by eliciting ELD to extract correlation scores. This process ensured that the resulting estimates of 
correlations were sound, stable, and accounted for the stress environment, uncertainty and bias. To ensure that 
biases were mitigated in the correlation matrix, a standardisation was applied. The table below details the final 
correlation matrix used to diversify the regulatory capital. 
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Table 4.5.9: Correlations Matrix  
 
 
Cell01 Cell02 Cell03 Cell04 Cell05 Cell06 Cell07 Cell08 Cell09 Cell10 Cell11 Cell12 Cell13 Cell14 Cell15 Cell16 Cell17 Cell18 Cell19 
Cell01 1 0.526 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.206 0.203 0.203 0.206 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.884 0.889 0.354 0.444 0.441 0.383 0.203 
Cell02 
 
1 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.225 0.222 0.222 0.225 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.424 0.41 0.694 0.694 0.69 0.695 0.222 
Cell03 
  
1 1 1 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.409 0.406 0.692 0.695 0.695 0.698 0.223 
Cell04 
   
1 1 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.409 0.406 0.692 0.695 0.695 0.698 0.223 
Cell05 
    
1 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.221 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.409 0.406 0.692 0.695 0.695 0.698 0.223 
Cell06 
     
1 0.998 0.998 0.228 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.418 0.405 0.687 0.685 0.68 0.686 0.998 
Cell07 
      
1 1 0.225 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.404 0.402 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.69 1.000 
Cell08 
       
1 0.225 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.404 0.402 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.69 1.000 
Cell09 
        
1 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.418 0.405 0.687 0.685 0.68 0.686 0.225 
Cell10 
         
1 1 1 0.404 0.402 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.69 0.226 
Cell11 
          
1 1 0.404 0.402 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.69 0.226 
Cell12 
           
1 0.404 0.402 0.686 0.685 0.685 0.69 0.226 
Cell13 
            
1 0.986 0.528 0.545 0.531 0.523 0.404 
Cell14 
             
1 0.516 0.531 0.527 0.52 0.402 
Cell15 
              
1 0.976 0.972 0.995 0.686 
Cell16 
               
1 0.998 0.989 0.685 
Cell17 
                
1 0.989 0.685 
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Cell18 
                 
1 0.69 
Cell19 
                  
1 
 
The AMA model in this thesis utilised 22 ORCs whose composition was dependent on the subject bank’s structure. The class is the lowest UOM, which represents the actual and potential loss systems where losses can 
occur (an example of a class could be internal fraud (ID) losses incurred in retail banking (a BU) within its treasury desk operations (a division)).  A blend or a cross between an operational risk loss event type (like IF) 
and a business unit (like retail banking BU) is referred to as an operational risk cell. In Table 4.5.9 ORCs have been aggregated into operational risk cells assuming independence between each class profile (an example 
of a cell could be IF losses incurred across all retail banking operations). 
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4.4.5 Diversification and Undiversified Pillar I Capital  
 
The key input parameters were: number of Monte Carlo simulations = 10,000; number of LDAs = 300; and 
number of LSA simulations = 1,000. Classes were aggregated into operational risk cells assuming independence 
between each class profile. The selected frequency and severity distributions in the penultimate stage of the Monte 
Carlo simulation were convoluted into an ALD. The leading ORC with a VaR of R602 million was cell 18 (see 
Table 4.5.10). Only the UL (UL = VaR-EL) was diversified using the Variance-Covariance Approach. Table 
4.5.10 presents the final capital numbers after diversification. The diversification formula used takes into 
consideration the EL, the undiversified VaR, and the correlation matrix in the table above. The diversification 
benefit was found to be 25.8%.  
 
Table 4.5.10: Advanced Measurement Approach  
 
Cell ID Risk Type  Expected Loss (EL)   Value at Risk (VaR)   Diversified VaR  
Cell01 BDSF       7 934 735.66         94 408 999.18         70 030 846.99  
Cell02 CPBP    19 699 949.57      263 432 405.17      195 409 278.98  
Cell03 EDPM    52 962 449.81      452 382 627.68      335 569 054.38  
Cell04 EF    36 194 135.83      311 657 853.82      231 182 023.57  
Cell05 IF    27 667 216.35      472 133 851.13      350 220 146.11  
Cell06 CPBP    26 682 122.89      515 306 964.69      382 245 162.11  
Cell07 EDPM    53 248 787.95      507 017 740.37      376 096 369.04  
Cell08 IF    23 283 153.30      191 546 689.45      142 085 786.49  
Cell09 CPBP       7 817 775.75         60 138 491.87         44 609 619.41  
Cell10 EDPM       9 233 111.88         80 880 051.08         59 995 323.87  
Cell11 EF       5 017 280.54         48 765 507.62         36 173 350.34  
Cell12 IF       3 654 095.61         51 246 674.31         38 013 833.84  
Cell13 BDSF    18 316 508.59      483 370 901.04      358 555 581.61  
Cell14 DPA    15 277 885.34      554 711 695.04      411 474 861.26  
Cell15 EPWS    14 571 666.96         53 924 868.30         40 000 468.53  
Cell16 EDPM    32 486 805.41      341 929 869.56      253 637 244.16  
Cell17 EDPM    13 218 261.58      151 330 892.57      112 254 453.22  
Cell18 EF    51 232 014.73      811 557 483.88      601 998 310.23  
Cell19 EF    74 203 390.70      226 651 303.12      168 125 738.72  
Total     492 701 348.44   5 672 394 869.86   4 207 677 452.85  
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This part of this study aims to build on Sundmacher’s (2007) paper, by testing one case of the AMA’s operational 
risk Pillar I charge in comparison to TSA and the AMA. This is in an attempt to capture and show the financial 
benefits that banks could potentially achieve should they opt to move from TSA or the AMA. The explicit benefit 
for this case of data (from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2017) was found to be TSA-AMA (R6 914 732 370.24 
- R4 207 677 453 = R2 707 054 917.38 (39.15% reduction)). We found that there was considerable enticement 
for banks to move from the BIA to TSA, and to proceed to the AMA. The AMA awards the entity under study a 
capital benefit or reprieve of 39.15% (17.97% in undiversified capital) in comparison to TSA’s calculated capital. 
The EL quantum was found to be R492 million. The arithmetic mean has in some instances caused erroneous 
results of the anticipated EL profile, owing to its sensitivity to tail losses (BIS, 196). The BIS advocates for 
alternate means such as the trimmed mean and the median as valuable alternatives. In this thesis, notwithstanding 
the cautions from the BCBS, we opted to use the standard mean (expectation of the annual ALD). Using the 
process illustrated in Chapter 3, financial institutions can estimate the tenable financial rewards or benefits for 
several years. Armed with the multiple or manifold year financial benefit, South African financial institutions can 
determine whether or not the benefits are such that they would warrant the bank assessing the costs of switching. 
This computed initial financial benefit could be potentially assigned to meet the expenses related to the 
technological systems required to meet the AMA’s qualification criteria. 
 
4.5. The Standardised Measurement Approach Input Data  
 
The SMA combines the bank’s idiosyncratic loss data (historical loss experience) that captures the bank’s relative 
sensitivity to operational risk, with a simple standardised measure of operational risk (BI). The BI comprises a 
financial statement proxy (reflecting business volume) of the overall risk exposure.  
 
The BI largely uses the same aspects of the P&L used in the calculation of the GI detailed in section Table 4.2.1, 
except for the fact that it uses absolute values for all components; it includes P&L on the banking book and also 
includes netted fee expenses or other operating expenses (calculated in Euros). In line with the BCBS’s (2018:96) 
text for Basel III monitoring, a single rate of 0.0799 (€1:ZaR 12.51564456) was applied across all balance sheet, 
income statement, and LC inputs used to compute the SMA. 
 
Table 4.6.1: Income Statement and Balance Sheet Inputs (in Euro) 
 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Income Statement (in €000’)           
Gross income          3 242 391           3 457 512           3 646 029          3 989 341              4 129 789  
Interest income           3 045 890           3 255 580           4 817 053          5 506 070              6 016 353  
Income from financial and op lease             11 815                13 244                12 598                11 583                 975 599  
Interest expenses; of which:          1 350 445           1 420 990           2 908 649          3 394 671             3 809 192  
Absolute value of net interest income          1 695 445           1 834 590          1 908 404          2 111 399             2 207 161  
Dividend income               15 931                14 053                34 193                15 522                 57 462  
Fee and Com          1 274 421           1 164 187           1 248 593           1 595 519          1 630 661  
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Fee and commission exp                         -                            -                            -                262 280               244 052  
Net profit on fin ops (trading book)             215 451              246 177              286 941              304 293                317 971  
Other operating income                41 143              198 505              167 899              224 887                160 585  
 Balance Sheet                          -                            -                            -                            -                              -    
Total assets        59 892 561         64 664 109        73 965 507         77 185 158          78 566 780  
of which: interest-earning assets        47 517 729         52 110 301         57 853 992         61 929 851            60 972 649  
 
Table 4.6.2 below reflects the interest income and expenses (including financial and operational lease), dividend 
income, and interest-earning assets for the three-year period ending 31 Dec 2017.  
 
Table 4.6.2: The Interest, Leases and Dividend Component  
 
Year Interest Income Interest Expenses ABS(II-IE) Dividend Income Interest Earning Assets 
2017      6 016 352 947          3 809 191 751     2 207 161 196                 57 462 003                60 972 648 800  
2016      5 506 070 001          3 394 671 015     2 111 398 986                 15 522 315                61 929 850 800  
2015      4 817 052 964          2 908 649 387     1 908 403 576                 34 193 308                57 853 992 000  
Averages      5 446 491 971          3 370 837 385     2 075 654 586                 35 725 875                60 252 163 867  
 
In dealing with the second item of the BI see Table 4.6.3.  
 
Table 4.6.3: The Services Component (SC) 
 
Year Other Operating 
Income 
Other Operating 
Expenses 
Fee Income (FI) Fee Expense (FE) ABS (FI-FE) 
2017         160 585 497                                -       1 630 661 362               244 051 754                  1 386 609 609  
2016         224 887 483                                -       1 595 519 314               262 280 184                  1 333 239 131  
2015         167 899 170                                -       1 248 592 503                                 -                    1 248 592 503  
Averages         184 457 383                                -       1 491 591 060               168 777 312                  1 322 813 747  
 
Table 4.6.3 reflects the other operating income and expenses (except for financial and operating lease), fee and 
commission income, and fee and commission expenses (reported in Euros) for the three-year period ending 31 
Dec 2017.  
 
Table 4.6.4: The Financial Component (FC) 
 
Year Net P&L Trading Book Net P&L Banking Book 
2017 317 970 599.30 - 
2016 304 293 182.53 - 
2015 286 940 852.16 - 
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Averages 303 068 211.33 - 
 
In dealing with the third component of the BI, Table 4.6.4 reflects the Net profit (loss) on financial operations 
(trading book) and net profit (loss) on financial operations (non-trading book) reported in Euros for the three-year 
period ending 31 Dec 2017.  
 
Table 4.6.5: Business Indicator Component  
 
 
ILDC Financial Component Service Component Business Indicator Business Indicator 
Component 
 
         1 391 399 562          303 068 211          1 676 048 443            3 370 516 217      475 577 433  
      
BI Buckets Bottom of Range Top of Range Test Business Indicator 
Component Per 
Range 
Marginal Coefficients 
1                               -         1 000 000 000                                    -    12% 
2          1 000 000 000     30 000 000 000   YES               475 577 433  15% 
3        30 000 000 000                             -                                      -    18% 
 
In dealing with the resultant BIC,  Table 4.6.5 reflects the ILDC, FC, SC, BI, and BIC reported in Euros for the 
period ending 31 Dec 2017. To estimate the BIC, the BI is multiplied by the marginal coefficients that increase 
with the size of the BI, as presented in Table 3.6.5 above. The bank under study is in the second bucket (2) (that 
is with a BI greater than €1bn but less than €30bn), translating to 15% marginal coefficients. The calculation of 
the BIC was done post noting the BI = €3.37bn, the BIC = (1 x 12%) + (3.37-1) x 15% + (0) x 18% = €0.475bn. 
 
4.5.1 Internal Loss Multiplier 
 
According to the Basel text, a firm’s operational risk loss experience is measured in the approximation of the 
operational risk regulatory reserve through the ILM. The LC is computed by multiplying 15 by the average annual 
losses over a 10-year period (in the context of this study this covers the period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 
2017). The treatment of the ILD has been extensively discussed in earlier parts of this chapter.  
 
Table 4.6.6: Internal Loss Data and the Loss Component  
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sum of Loss (ZaR) 134 090 108 006  68 931  67 802 129 480 64 923 103 349 178 397 336 533 347 980 
Recovery (ZaR)  2 283  6 522  4 421  2 522  12 563  31 099  34 761 117 269  79 840  18 156 
Count  54  73  59  66  78  70  7   103   87   70  
NET (Euro) 131 806 101 484  64 510   65 279  116 917  33 823   68 588   61 127   256 693   329 824  
Net Loss (Euro)   10 531  8 109   5 154   5 216   9 342   2 702   5 480   4 884   20 510   26 353  
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Table 4.6.6 reflects the sum of losses incurred between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2017 reported in Euros 
for the period ending 31 Dec 2017.  
 
4.6 The Standardised Measurement Approach Results  
 
The SMA combines the bank’s idiosyncratic loss data (historical loss experience) that captures the bank’s relative 
sensitivity to operational risk, with a simple standardised measure of operational risk (BI). The BI comprises a 
financial statement proxy (reflecting business volume) of the bank’s overall risk exposure. He BIS’ research found 
that operational loss exposure is positively correlated to the BI, and as a result the proposed calibration 
incrementally increases the marginal coefficients for the indicator. Introducing the SMA was considered to 
potentially increase the minimum regulatory capital requirements, with varying degrees per given financial 
institution. In this section we detail our SMA results, where we juxtapose these results against the BIA, TSA, and 
the AMA’s results in the closing parts of this section. 
 
4.6.1 The Standardised Measurement Approach’s Findings 
 
As per December 2017 guidance from the BCBS, a new SMA is most likely to be introduced in 2022, replacing 
all previous approaches to calculating operational risk capital requirements under Pillar 1 (including the AMA). 
As well as changing the way Pillar 1 capital requirements are calculated (with losses and recoveries acting as 
direct inputs into the calculation), there are also extensive disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 (including losses 
and recoveries). The quality and integrity of loss data is of significant importance under the new standards (and 
any exclusions due to non-compliance with the standards must be publicly disclosed). Furthermore, there is a 
requirement to collect information on the date of accounting (as well as date of occurrence and date of discovery), 
and to be able to identify both non-insurance recoveries and insurance recoveries for each loss (based on the date 
of receipt of the recovery). Thus, it is imperative that firms are able to collect loss data that meets the new 
requirements, and link or reconcile insurance recoveries to their losses. In addition, as insurance recoveries will 
impact Pillar 1 capital requirements from 2022 (factoring in up to 10 years of data), insurance recoveries currently 
in place, will impact future capital requirements. This thesis includes a quantitative assessment of the capital 
implied by the new SMA approach, including the variability due to supervisory discretion, and a qualitative 
assessment of views on the expected implementation by jurisdiction. 
 
Table 4.7.1: Standardised Measurement Approach Results  
 
 
2015 2016 2017 
Interest, leases and dividend component (ILDC)  15 050 158   16 401 280   17 414 262  
Services  component (SC)  17 082 801   19 188 946   20 976 827  
Financial  Component (FC)  3 122 939   3 493 579   3 793 094  
Business Indicator (BI)  35 255 898   39 083 805   42 184 183  
BI Component (BIC)  4 912 915   5 487 101   5 952 158  
Loss Component (LC);  ≥ €20k  1 206 628   1 500 380   1 845 078  
Loss Component (LC);  ≥ €100k  804 218   1 093 148   1 443 573  
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Internal Loss Multiplier: 
   
 based on average total losses  ≥ €20k  0.714669   0.728841   0.746730  
 based on average total losses ≥ €100k  0.669555   0.689826   0.713072  
Standardised approach; based on average total losses: 
   
 ≥ €20k  3 511 107   3 999 222   4 444 655  
 ≥ €100k  3 289 468   3 785 143   4 244 316  
 With ILM set to 1  4 912 915   5 487 101   5 952 158  
 
The SMA combines the bank’s idiosyncratic loss data that captures the bank’s relative sensitivity to operational 
risk, with a simple standardised measure of operational risk. One of the issues behind the year-long deferment in 
agreeing to the Basel reforms was concern regarding consistent implementation of the standard. Since the BCBS 
concluded negotiations in December 2017, few national supervisors have provided guidance on how the proposals 
will be adopted. In February, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) announced that it will not 
apply the ILM, preferring to set operational risk capital using only the BIC. However, if it judges an institution’s 
standardised capital to be too low, then supervisory adjustments to the ADI’s prudential capital requirement may 
be considered. Similarly, in Europe, some quarters expect the ILM to be excluded. This is based on the ECB’s 
impact assessment of the Basel reforms in December 2017, which assumed that the EU jurisdiction chooses to 
implement the national discretion of setting the ILM for operational risk equal to 1. Thus, a significant theme 
identified in our results that requires additional attention is the uncertainty in impact. Supervisors have the 
discretion to modify the loss multiplier’s role within the capital calculation. In this thesis we assessed three 
possible implementations: Capital = BIC x ILM (with losses > €20k) – the default approach; Capital = BIC x ILM 
(with losses > €100k); and Capital = BIC (With ILM set to 1). Setting the ILM equivalent to one implies that the 
BIC and LC are equal. Analysing the BIC as a percentage of Pillar 1 Capital, we find that the ILM has a significant 
influence on capital. While reductions in Pillar I Capital can potentially be envisaged in certain jurisdictions, there 
can be large increases in other jurisdictions as a result of including the ILM. Our study established that by setting 
the ILM equal to one, the net increase in capital is 34% in comparison to the default SMA, where €20k is used. 
This is an example of the potential impact of supervisory discretion that may result in variability in comparison 
to the default SMA approach. Supervisors can also increase the loss collection threshold from €20k to €100k. We 
found that increasing the collection threshold resulted in relatively minor capital reductions in each case. 
Additionally, no guidance has been published on non-Euro currency calculations, which further increases the 
uncertainty of impact. We also found that the Rand:Euro rate applied to both the BIC and the LC was a significant 
input parameter to the framework. Differing interpretations of the BCBS text might lead a single rate being applied 
across all 10 years in the LC, and all three years in the BIC. An alternate interpretation suggests using an annual 
average foreign exchange conversion rate for each year used in the calculation. In our set of results, we applied a 
single foreign exchange conversion rate across all years. To accurately assess the impact, there is a clear need for 
greater clarity from the SARB regarding their expected implementation. This would give national certainty for 
the South African financial markets, but still leaves potential for significant international variation and 
questionable comparability. 
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Table 4.7.4: The Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised Approach, the Advanced Measurement Approach, 
and the Standardised Measurement Approach Results (R’000) 
 
  2015 2016 2017 
Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)   6 496 658   6 964 086         7 384 785  
Standardised Approach (TSA)                          -                            -           6 914 732  
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)       
* Undiversified VAR                         -                            -           5 672 394 
* Diversified VaR                          -                            -           4 207 677   
SMA; based on Ave total losses:       
 ≥ €20k  3 511 107   3 999 222   4 444 655  
 ≥ €100k  3 289 468   3 785 143   4 244 316  
 With ILM set to 1  4 912 915   5 487 101   5 952 158  
 
It was assumed that introducing the SMA would potentially increase the minimum regulatory capital requirements 
compared to those of the current BIA, TSA, and AMA regime. According to the Basel text a firm’s loss experience 
is considered in the estimation of Pillar I Capital through the ILM. Our results established that the bank under 
study incurred net operational risk losses amounting to R1.539 billion (739 events as defined by the BCBS) and 
has recovered R309 million (a 20% recovery rate) through insurance claims and their own loss recovery means. 
This translates to a net loss of R1.230 billion (€98 million). Our results show that the LC (R1.8 billion - 2017) 
was found to be smaller than the BIC (R5.9 billion) by a factor of 3.24 times (2017), which by implication means 
the ILM is less than one. The ILM (with losses > €20k) was found to be 0.7467 (2017) whilst ILM (with losses > 
€100k) was found to be 0.7130 (2017) respectively. We thus concluded that financial institutions that have a 
smaller relative loss operational risk profile to its BIC, as is the case in the bank under study, will hold a lower 
Pillar I Capital reserve in comparison to the capital charge implied by an ILM = 1. Our results show that the 
percentage change in the SMA components was higher in 2016 than it was in 2017. This was largely driven by 
the BICs against the backdrop of an 8.35% increase in the GI (2016). Comparing Pillar I regulatory reserve as a 
fraction or percentage of the GI, gives a clearer picture of relative capitalisation, regardless of the estimation 
approach being used. We found the following Pillar I Capital to GI ratios (2017):  14.11% (BIA), 13.38% (TSA), 
10.97% (Undiversified AMA), 8.14% (Diversified AMA), 8.599% (SMA ≥ €20k), 7.64% (SMA ≥ €100k) and 
11.056% (SMA with ILM set to 1) of GI. We made a similar comparison of Pillar I Capital per full time employee 
(30,000 employees), our results show that as at 31 December 2017 similar sized banks will hold on average the 
highest level of Pillar I Capital on the BIA (R246k per employee), the TSA (R230k per employee), the 
Undiversified AMA (R189k per employee), the Diversified AMA (R140k per employee, the lowest holding ratio 
of all options), the SMA where the threshold is €100k (R141k per employee), the SMA where the threshold is 
€20k (R148k), and the SMA with ILM set to one (R198k). Our results show that capital increases are primarily 
likely to be seen in the largest banks (those with assets exceeding €750 billion), whereas in smaller banks the 
impact is neutral or muted.  
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4.7 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter dealt with the data statistics, data sources, data collection methods, data cleansing processes, and the 
research population. Annual financial statements for the financial institution under study, the internet, and other 
publications in local media platforms, and operational risk journals were extensively used in this study. In the 
BIA, TSA, and the newly proposed SMA, generic alpha and beta factors and fixed formulas were used. The 
chapter also detailed the results and analyses of our findings. Overall, we find that the BCBS’s primary proposal 
that postulates that there is value in a financial institution moving from the BIA to TSA or TSA to the AMA is 
indeed valid, but is violated in the movement from the AMA to the SMA. The best Pillar I Capital reprieve is 
offered by the Diversified AMA, whilst the second best is the SMA based on an average total loss threshold of 
€100k at R4.2 billion (0.87% higher than the AMA), closely followed by the default SMA based on an average 
total loss threshold of €20k at R4.444 billion (5.63% higher than AMA), to be introduced in 2022. Notwithstanding 
the BCBS’s objectives of promoting reduced model complexity, improving comparability of risk-based capital 
measures, and establishing consistency in the application of global bank standards, there is a strong basis for 
retaining the AMA owing to the fact that accurately modelling operational risk assists management to recognise 
where the leading exposures are within the bank. By analysing such exposures, in the context of KRIs and RCSAs, 
managers are informed of the organisational profile, and choices can then be made regarding risk transfer and risk 
mitigation strategies. Additionally, a Diversified AMA also offers a 5.63% Pillar I Capital reprieve to financial 
institutions, in comparison to the proposed SMA (SMA ≥ €20k). Regardless of the specific implementation, we 
are of the view that removing internal models will result in increased supervisory focus on Pillar II and stress 
testing. Thus, an area of interest is the future supervisory treatment of parts of the AMA’s framework, such as the 
use of the ELD and the Scenario Analysis, which some regulators are likely to want to retain in some form. The 
following chapter details the conclusions, the thesis’ final recommendations, and suggested auxiliary research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter summarises the study’s findings, and presents conclusions and recommendations regarding the areas 
that require further research. The goal of this research was to determine whether or not measuring a bank’s 
operational risk using a more sophisticated measurement tool, in the form of the SMA and the AMA provides a 
rand benefit in comparison to TSA and the BIA. However, the goal of the thesis was not to explicitly measure the 
costs of the switch, but to determine if the benefits are such that they warrant a bank assessing the costs of 
switching. A case-study method was applied to address the research objectives, using in-house loss data from one 
of the major South African banks, ELD loss, and Scenario Analysis, based on a hypothetical example. The results 
of the study show that material gains can be achieved by a bank by switching from the BIA to TSA to the AMA 
in terms of lowering their requirements for regulatory capital.  
 
Overall, we found that the BIS’s primary proposal that postulates that there is value in a financial institution 
moving from the BIA to TSA, or TSA to the AMA is indeed valid, but is violated in the movement from the AMA 
to the SMA. The best Pillar I Capital reprieve is offered by Diversified AMA, whilst the second best is SME, 
based on an average total loss threshold of €100k at R4.2 billion (0.87% higher than AMA), closely followed by 
the default SMA based on an average total loss threshold of €20k at R4.444 billion (5.63% higher than AMA), to 
be introduced in 2022. Notwithstanding the BCBS’s objectives of promoting reduced model complexity, 
improving comparability of risk-based capital measures, and establishing consistency in the application of global 
bank standards, there is a strong argument for retaining the AMA owing to the fact that accurately modelling 
operational risk assists management to recognise where the leading exposures are within the bank. By analysing 
such exposures, in the context of KRIs and RCSAs, managers are informed of the organisational profile, and thus 
choices can be made regarding risk transfer and risk mitigation strategies. Additionally, the Diversified AMA also 
offers a 5.63% Pillar I Capital reprieve to financial institutions in comparison to the proposed SMA (SMA ≥ 
€20k). The technical challenge to interpret and understand these models is common in firms and their supervisors. 
The regulatory community appears to be monitoring these methods and considering the challenges that banks 
face, and are open to engaging with banks’ modellers in terms of finding ways forward. Policy-makers recognise 
the need for improved and more accurate models, and appear to be striking a cautiously optimistic note. Thus, 
regardless of the specific implementation, we are of the view that removing internal models will result in an 
increased supervisory focus on Pillar II and stress testing. Thus, an area of interest is the future supervisory 
treatment of parts of the AMA framework, such as the use of the ELD and Scenario Analysis, which some 
regulators will likely seek to retain in some form. All approaches developed and utilised in this thesis are compliant 
with both the SARB and the BCBS’s stipulated requirements. The methodologies are sufficiently detailed, allowing 
other smaller African financial institutions to mimic them for any of the operational risk quantification 
methodologies. However, we highlight the impacts of data quality and quantity per ORC data. In the earlier part of 
this chapter we detailed areas of further study relating to ways of increasing the use of ILD and ELD. The ELD 
would need to be scaled in line with the risk profile of the financial institution whose operational risk capital is 
being estimated. These areas of additional research or further work are the natural phenomena of any research study 
rather than an indication of severe mis-specification. Notwithstanding the data limitations to just one of the big four 
South African banks, this work is still expected to have a practical impact for all African financial institutions that 
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might seek to implement any of the more complex techniques. This work is instrumental in assisting this market to 
design BIA, TSA, AMA, and SMA frameworks that yield potentially low capital reserve charges. In our opinion, 
the AMA still seems to be a giant leap in attempting to understand operational risk, and we believe that its retention 
would benefit African financial institutions. The Basel Committee’s need for comparison and simplicity could be 
achieved by limiting the probability distributions used in fitting ILD, ELD, and scenario data, reducing the 
confidence level from the current 99.9% to 95%, and implementing stricter scenario construction rules. Although 
the SMA is considered to be intended for all financial institutions regardless of their risk profile and size, contra to 
this line of thought, operational risk is by nature idiosyncratic to a financial institution’s systems, people, and 
processes. It is thus incomprehensible that a formula could be used to describe or capture the UL configurations for 
each financial institution across the world. 
 
5.1 Suggested Recommendations for Further Research  
 
The AMA model that was developed in this thesis, and utilised in all 22 ORCs whose composition depends on the 
subject bank’s structure. After cleansing the data, only 22,579 (14.7% of the raw data set) data points formed part 
of the calculation data sets. As a result, some ORCs had limited data (4) or no data (3) at all. This thinning out of 
data in some ORCs resulted in the model being heavily driven by the Scenario Analysis inputs. This is a challenge 
that is largely pervasive across financial institutions in southern Africa. There were 15 (of the 22) classes that had 
sufficient data for modelling, i.e. equal to or having more than 25 data points. Of these, six passed all of the 
robustness tests (Class 10, 12, 13, 16, and 18). No distributions could be selected for all ORCs that did not have 
any data points, or that had limited data points. This was true for ORC 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, and 21. The 
insufficiency in the number of observations resulted in the ILD playing a limited role in determining the AMA 
Pillar I Capital charge. For further research, some sensitivity and an Impact Analysis had to be done to determine 
the ideal number of ORCs (and thus by extension the level of granularity), and to better understand this aspect of 
the thesis. This, by implication, means that a potential solution could be in simply increasing the granularity level 
to enrich the ORC data. An additional solution that requires further study is the possibility of allowing the second 
in line or choice distribution to be assessed at enterprise level.  
 
The use of ELD in the AMA model is also an additional area that requires further study. Zhou, Giancometti, 
Fabozzi, and Tucker (2012) assessed mixing pooled data (ELD) with ILD, the variation being the development of 
a scaling tool that would allow to right size the ELD to a point of relevance for South African domiciled institutions. 
Present approaches of various models are significantly dependent on the quality of the ELD and the respective 
databases. Most external databases do not meet the rigorous quality criteria that are required for statistical use. The 
notable challenges relate to scalability into locally sized data, complications in fitting the data, accounting for 
various collection thresholds, and inconsistences in categorisation. Thus, we did not conduct an ILD and ELD 
mixed model in this study, owing to these limitations. However, we do acknowledge such theories as the Credibility 
Theory, which has been largely utilised in the insurance industry to handle data sourced from different places. In 
this theory, no singular data source is utilised on its own to provide a complete story, instead, for any population, 
the respective data source is instrumental in characterising the distribution. There are instances where a weighted 
average of the parameter estimates obtained from various sources is used. These weights depend on priori of the 
distribution. Bayesian, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), Non-Parametric empirical sampling, and EVT are 
alternative approaches.  
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Other techniques applied in other risk disciplines that can potentially be explored to redress the thin operational 
risk data include bootstrapping, boosting and bootstrap aggregation (also called bagging). Boosting concerns the 
overweighting of scarcer observations in a training data set to ensure that the model focuses more intensively on 
those observations. In credit risk modelling, this has been particularly useful when modelling low-default portfolios 
to ensure that the defaulted observations are sufficiently included in the modelling process. In “bagging,” a model 
is run hundreds or thousands of times, each on a different sub-sample of the data set, to improve its predictive 
performance.  The final model, also called an “ensemble”, constitutes a group of sub-models whose outcomes are 
combined by weighted average or voting. One of the key insights is that such averaging over many small models 
tends to provide a better out-of-sample prediction than choosing a single model. A key drawback of more complex, 
non-parametric models, such as deep learning and ensembles, is that they can be difficult to interpret (the so-called 
black box problem). While they may have excellent out-of-sample predictive performances, the larger number of 
variables and the opacity of the structure of these models could prevent one from gaining insight into the nature of 
the relationship between input variables and outputs. However, there are several ways to deal with this issue. 
 
The modelling in this thesis relies on algorithms to develop models from the subject bank’s data. The algorithms 
discussed in this paper developed models based on the data they used. While algorithms automate the process of 
inferring a model from the data, we did note that they requires significant coding, tuning of hyperparameters, and 
data preparation, to best perform their tasks on a specific data set. The algorithms used in this thesis were coded 
in MATLAB® programming language. A limiting factor to this thesis was that most of the statistical and 
econometric methods used could only be applied to well-defined, structured, numerical datasets (such as Excel 
sheets and tables). Structured data refers to data that is well-organised and clarifies and standardises the data 
relationships. This makes it easy to access and analyse the data. Therefore, conventional statistical methods have 
been able to analyse this type of information. Examples include relational databases, such as SQL or Excel sheets. 
Semi-structured data does not conform to the formal structure of data models associated with relational databases 
or other forms of data tables, but nonetheless contains tags or other markers to separate semantic elements and 
enforce hierarchies of records and fields within the data. A key example of semi-structured data formats is an 
NoSQL database, which are more primitive than structured databases such as Excel or SQL in terms of data 
manipulation capabilities, but are helpful for storing larger amounts of data, such as millions of observations.  
Other file types include XML and email. Unstructured data refers to data that does not have a structure making it 
readily accessible for analysis. Examples are mobile and sensor data, social media streams, , and videos. Prominent 
examples of machine learning applications to analyse unstructured types of information are face and speech 
recognition, and robotic process automation. These types of machine learning are increasingly being applied to 
automate some tasks that require human action or decision-making. Some researchers have had much success in 
applying machine learning algorithms to less structured types of data. Therefore, this could be an area of further 
research where machine learning is used to analyse operational risk big data which refers to datasets of high 
velocity (speed and continuity of new data generation), variety (different forms, types, structures), volume (size 
in terms of observations and variables), and veracity (typically, a low data quality due to noise and lack of 
structure). We acknowledge the fact that machine learning models, particularly non-parametric models, require 
significantly large data sets to develop models. However, they do not need to be applied to new data sources; 
learning from machine learning in the credit risk context is almost exclusively applied to batch data, rather than 
real-time generated data, and with a high quality and structure. This could be further extended to consider 
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unsupervised machine learning, which entails analysing a data set without predicting a dependent variable within 
an operational risk context. Examples are clustering and dimensionality reduction, which allow one to show 
patterns and structures in a data set. Indeed, both getting better use of existing data, and being able to apply 
additional data sources, are significant motives for banks that are considering embarking upon new machine 
learning programmes. While the overwhelming majority of applications currently being pursued by banks for 
operational risk modelling are predicated on existing (structured) data sources, some banks looking into using 
new or unstructured data is warranted.  In such circumstances, these initiatives should be considered additional to 
existing risk management, rather than substitutes. 
 
The BCBS published its principles governing risk data aggregation in 2013, which stemmed from recommendations 
from the Financial Services Board’s (FSB) (2011) progress report on supervision. While this focused primarily on 
data management and reporting for the purpose of resolvability, it covered topics such as overarching governance, 
infrastructure, data quality, model validation, effective challenge, risk reporting practices, and supervisory reviews. 
As individual jurisdictions started implementing model risk management guidance, the most comprehensive 
regulatory guidance was the US’s Federal Reserve System’s (FRS) Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk 
Management. This defines models as quantitative methods that apply concepts, methods, and conventions to 
organise input data into measureable elements. Sources of model risk include errors when generating outputs and 
applying inappropriate models to a situation, or a model being used incorrectly or inappropriately. A primary tool 
used to manage this risk is the effective challenge, which is an acute review by impartial parties to identify model 
precincts and conventions. However, due to timing constraints, our thesis did not focus on validating the models 
used in this thesis. Model validation is the set of processes and activities intended to verify that models are 
performing as expected, in line with their design objectives and business uses. This requires banks to, inter alia, 
conduct on-going monitoring of their models to evaluate whether changes in products, exposures, activities, clients, 
or market conditions necessitate adjustment, redevelopment, or replacement of the model and to verify that any 
extension of the model beyond its original scope is valid. Benchmarking, the comparison of a given model’s inputs 
and outputs to estimates from alternative internal or external data or models is a key element of monitoring, and an 
area where further research can be done to experiment with machine learning. Typically, machine learning is used 
to develop models that serve as the challengers” or benchmarks to the “champion model in production. The 
challenger models do not need to comply with all of the requirements for the “champion” regulatory model, and 
thus can be more complex and opaque, prompting the use of non-parametric and other approaches that can provide 
highly granular insight into data relations. Applying machine learning for model benchmarking has a number of 
benefits. Firstly, model validation regulations require banks to maintain large repositories of challenger models, 
including documentation, and to recalibrate them frequently. Automated machine learning tools can help to refresh 
models quickly, by running them on new data while automatically documenting the decisions and changes made. 
Second, machine learning models can capture granular relationships in the data that simpler modelling approaches 
might not. Thus, banks challenge their champion models (which are typically based on ordinary least squares or 
logistic regressions), using a variety of approaches including machine learning, to see if they have missed a key 
insight. The machine learning models can exhibit variable interactions or curvature that are not captured in the 
champion model. After developing the challenger model, partial dependency plots are used to gain insight into how 
the model’s prediction changes as a function of each input.  
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5.2 Conclusion  
 
The motivations for banks in pursuing modelling techniques align to a dual set of motives for the broader digital 
transformations currently under way across banks’ risk management functions. In some cases, the digitisation 
agenda represents a proactive effort to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the risk management function, 
to be smarter, to get improved views of risks, and to be more responsive, and armed with better analytics. There 
are tangible benefits to pursue here, with 20-30% savings in operational risk losses projected as banks adopt better 
analytical models. In other cases, the motive can be one of the risk functions to keep pace with the increased 
digitisation of the front-line. As newer, faster digital channels are being offered for customer sales and fulfilment, 
there are increased expectations of speed-to-market when making credit decisions. At the time of writing this 
thesis, several banks, through their strategic intent (detailed in their financial statements) indicated that they are 
in the process of launching a ‘digital bank’ or a new electronic platform to penetrate new retail customer segments, 
with new operational and credit risk modelling required to score and price those customers on a ‘real time’ basis. 
Delivering a faster operational and credit decision is a critical component of the digital customer experience. 
Where banks indicate the desire to achieve greater efficiency in modelling, it is so that they can do more modelling, 
better and faster. This is consistent with the findings of The Institute of International Finance-McKinsey 2017 
study on the digitalisation of risk management, which emphasised timeliness, quality of risk management, and 
productivity as principal drivers. Thus, the contribution of this work addresses the fact that we could not find any 
work comprehensive enough to include all four available operational risk quantification approaches (the BIA, 
TSA, the AMA, and the SMA), for the South African market in particular. Overall, we find that the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s primary consideration that postulates that there is value in a financial 
institution moving from the Basic Indicator Approach to the Standardised Approach, or from the Standardised 
Approach to the Advanced Measurement Approach is indeed valid, but fails in the movement from an Advanced 
Measurement Approach to a Standardised Measurement Approach. This work foresees South African financial 
institutions pushing back on the implementation of SMA, and potentially lobbying the regulator to remain in AMA 
– as the alternative might mean increased capital requirements leading to reduced Economic Value Added to 
shareholders (as more capital is required at the same level of profitability or business activity). The financial 
institutions are anticipated to sight advanced modelling techniques as helping management have a deeper 
understanding of their exposures – whilst the Scenario Analysis process allows them a method of identifying their 
key risks and quantifying them (adding to management’s tools set). However, if South African financial 
institutions want to compete at a global stage and wanted to be accepted among ‘internationally active’ institutions 
– their adoption of SMA may not be a choice but an obligation and an entry ticket to the game (global trade). 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table 4.7.2: Pillar I Regulatory Reserve as a Percentage of Gross Income  
 
  31-Dec-15 31-Dec-16 31-Dec-17 
Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) 14.099% 13.948% 14.288% 
Standardised Approach (TSA)                -                  -    13.378% 
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)        
* Undiversified                -                  -    10.975% 
* Diversified                -                  -    8.141% 
Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA); based on Average Total Losses:       
 ≥ €20k 7.620% 8.010% 8.599% 
 ≥ €100k 7.139% 7.581% 8.212% 
 With ILM set to 1 10.662% 10.990% 11.516% 
 
Table 4.7.3: Business Indicator component as a percentage of Pillar 1 Capital 
 
 
2015 2016 2017 
Standardised Measurement Approach (SMA); based on average total losses: 
   
 ≥ €20k 140% 137% 134% 
 ≥ €100k 149% 145% 140% 
 With ILM set to 1 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 4.7.5: Relative Change – Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised Approach, the Advanced 
Measurement Approach, and the Standardised Measurement Approach  
 
   % Change from BIA   % Change from TSA  Change from AMA Change from SMA 
Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) 0.00% 6.80% 75.51% 66.15% 
Standardised Approach (TSA)  -6.37% 0.00% 64.34% 55.57% 
AMA 
    
* Undiversified VAR -23.19% -17.97% 34.81% 27.62% 
* Diversified VaR  -43.02% -39.15% 0.00% -5.33% 
SMA; based on Ave total losses: 
    
 ≥ €20k -39.81% -35.72% 5.63% 0.00% 
 ≥ €100k -42.53% -38.62% 0.87% -4.51% 
 With ILM set to 1 -19.40% -13.92% 41.46% 33.92% 
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